

Fall 2019

BERKELEY PUBLIC POLICY JOURNAL

IMAGINING TRANSFORMATIVE FUTURES

Providing Free Contraceptives for Young People: Lessons from Colorado

Leveraging Low Carbon Fuel Standard Credits to Improve Electric Vehicle Rate Design

The Generational Squeeze: Young Californians' Outlook in the Wake of the Great Recession

ANALYZING SYSTEMIC INJUSTICE

Custodial Torture: Juvenile Justice Homes in India

Race, Segregation, and Education in Georgia

...AND AN INTERVIEW WITH PROFESSOR SARU JAYARAMAN



EDITORS' NOTE

It is our pleasure to present the Fall 2019 issue of the Berkeley Public Policy Journal. As with all editions, it is the result of many months of work by our talented and dedicated authors and editors, including more than 20 current students or recent graduates of the Goldman School of Public Policy. We are so grateful to our phenomenal team of editors that make this publication possible, and we are especially thankful to Althea Lyness-Fernandez for her invaluable role designing the beautiful printed product you hold in your hands.

The articles in the following pages respond to the tension inherent in public policy discourse. On the one hand, as shapers of public policy, we are trained to respond to the present reality of public problems by imagining possible futures free of these ills. On the other, as analysts and critics, we are also trained to identify the systemic flaws that encumber all of our individual policy decisions and proposals with the heavy weight of historical injustices, wrongs for which the consequences may reverberate across generations. We imagine the world as we would see it, examine the world as it is, and attempt to see how the former may be built out of the latter.

Our authors respond to this tension using a dizzying array of methods and evidentiary case studies. In “Providing Free Contraceptives for Young People,” Devan Shea examines lessons from Colorado in providing contraceptive access, arguing for a “patient-centered and rights-based perspective” to ensure genuine reproductive justice. Devika Agrawal examines the alarming state of the Indian juvenile justice system in “Custodial Torture: Juvenile Justice Homes

in India.” Caroline Palmer’s “Leveraging Low Carbon Fuel Standard Credits to Improve Electric Vehicle Rate Design” argues that the implementation of California’s Low Carbon Fuel Standard for electric utilities offers a perfect opportunity to improve the efficiency of electric vehicle rate design, and provides recommendations for doing so. Joseph Monardo examines the legacy of racist segregation policies in K-12 education for “Race, Segregation, and Education in Georgia,” arguing that much of the present observable segregation in school systems remains a direct result of historical systems of discrimination often imagined to be “past.” A team of researchers from Berkeley’s own Institute for Young Americans collaborated for “The Generational Squeeze: Young Californians’ Financial Outlook in the Wake of the Great Recession,” to describe how young Californians have fared since the 2008 recession, a timely topic as global economic indicators once again signal an impending recession. Finally Professor Saru Jayaraman sat down with the Journal to discuss her work advocating for improved wages and conditions for the nation’s restaurant workforce.

At a moment when this nation’s political present lurches between the incomprehensible and the intolerable, we are reminded by our authors to move beyond reaction and use the tools of policy analysis for which we are trained to design alternative systems that are authentically reflective of our fundamental values. We can’t wait for you to read these pieces and hope you consider how these ideas, arguments, and data can help all of us build the kind of global community to which we aspire.

Ben Menzies & Maitreyi Sistla

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A blue background with scattered white pills and a red and blue pipette. The pipette is positioned diagonally, with the red tip pointing towards the bottom left. The blue part of the pipette has the numbers '14' and '15' printed on it. The white pills are scattered across the blue background.

PROVIDING FREE CONTRACEPTIVES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE: LESSONS FROM COLOARDO

by Devan Shea

PROVIDING FREE CONTRACEPTIVES FOR YOUNG PEOPLE: LESSONS FROM COLORADO

DEVAN SHEA

Edited by: Fiona McBride and Annie McDonald

As a highly effective method of pregnancy prevention, long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARCs) have recently become a critical component of reproductive justice and family planning programs for adolescents in the United States. However, LARC promotion must also be viewed in the context of reproductive coercion and oppression of low-income and minority communities in the States. This article discusses the successes of LARC programs, using the Colorado Family Planning initiative as a case study, while also providing recommendations to ensure that programs are balanced with patient-centered care and a respect for reproductive autonomy.

INTRODUCTION

Long-acting reversible contraceptives (LARCs) are the most effective, non-permanent methods for pregnancy prevention currently available.¹ LARCs are a critically important piece of the contraceptive method mix, providing a highly reliable, safe, and reversible option for long-term prevention. Adolescents and young people are thought to benefit especially from LARCs,² and a growing number of U.S. states have implemented LARC promotion programs aimed at adolescents and young people who seek services in publicly-funded clinics.³

However, this enthusiasm for LARCs warrants caution in the broader context of reproductive oppression and coercion.⁴ Communities of color, low-income individuals, and young people in the United States have been historically targeted by coercive population policies and programs, including forced and coerced ster-

ilization and LARC use. For these communities, LARCs carry a dark history.

Public investment in LARCs will benefit millions of adolescents and young people. The challenge for policymakers is balancing the public policy goal of expanding access to a highly effective but costly method of pregnancy prevention with the reproductive justice goal of ensuring young people have the resources, knowledge, and power to make decisions about their reproductive futures.⁵

To uncover the elements of a successful, patient-centered, rights-based LARC access program, I will review evidence showing that removing financial barriers to LARCs improves access for adolescents and young people, with a special focus on the Colorado Family Planning Initiative. I will also discuss several worrying elements of LARC policies and programs, which could unintentionally harm young people by restricting their autonomy and

reproductive rights. Using a reproductive justice framework, I will offer recommendations for policymakers who wish to improve access to LARCs for adolescents and young people. If properly balanced with patient-centered care, comprehensive services, and respect for reproductive autonomy, publicly-funded LARC programs will help young people meet their sexual and reproductive health goals.

BACKGROUND: LARCS AND ADOLESCENTS

LARCs have been enthusiastically embraced by the reproductive health community as a first-line method for adolescents, recommended by both the American Academy of Pediatrics⁶ and the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists.⁷ LARCs include hormonal intrauterine devices (IUDs) and hormonal subdermal implants, effective for 3-7 years, and copper IUDs, effective for up to 12 years.⁸

LARCs are recommended as a first-line contraceptive method for adolescents because they have extremely low failure rates, are effective for several years, and require little maintenance.⁹ However, LARCs remain inaccessible to many who might otherwise choose them. The high upfront cost of the device and insertion procedures; lack of awareness or accurate knowledge about LARCs and how they work; provider biases and misconceptions; clinic stock-outs; and lack of access to trained providers are all documented barriers.¹⁰ Young people face additional challenges related to consent and confidentiality; provider biases and misconceptions about the suitability of LARCs for adoles-

cents; and delays in LARC initiation.¹¹

PUBLICLY-FUNDED LARCS FOR ADOLESCENTS

Financial barriers are among the most significant impediments to LARC access for young people, especially those who are low-income, uninsured, or reside in low-resourced areas. Programs that lower the cost of providing LARCs in publicly-funded clinics have thus become an increasingly popular public policy intervention.

Growing evidence shows that reducing or removing financial barriers to LARCs increases levels of uptake, particularly among adolescents and young women,¹² and that increasing access to LARCs reduces adolescent pregnancy rates at the population level.¹³ Indeed, research attributes the overall decline in pregnancy rates among adolescents in the U.S. since 2007 almost entirely to improved access to contraceptives, particularly highly effective contraceptives like LARCs.¹⁴ By these measures, Colorado's Family Planning Initiative is a paradigm for success in public health interventions designed to increase the use of LARCs.

CASE STUDY: COLORADO FAMILY PLANNING INITIATIVE

In 2007, a private donor invested \$27 million in the Colorado state government to reduce unplanned pregnancies by expanding family planning services. In 2009, the Colorado Department of Public Health and the Environment (CDPHE) launched the Colorado Family Planning Initiative in Title X-funded family planning clin-

ics across the state.¹⁵ Title X of the Public Health Service Act provides federal funding for reproductive health services reaching low-income, uninsured clients.

The anchoring strategy of the initiative was to expand access to all contraceptive methods by removing cost barriers to the most effective methods, LARCs. Donor funding allowed clinics to purchase LARC devices at little to no cost and paid for provider training and capacity building in the clinics that provided them.¹⁶

According to the CDPHE, between 2009 and 2014 the initiative helped cut the unintended pregnancy rate by 40 percent for young women aged 15-19 and 20 percent for young women aged 20-24; and helped reduce birth rates and abortion rates by nearly half for young women aged 15-19, and by about 20 percent for women aged 20-24.¹⁷ University of Colorado economists estimated that the program saved between \$66.1 and \$69.6 million in public program costs over the five year period.¹⁸

Several aligning factors made Colorado's initiative a success. Two of these factors are especially relevant to policy makers: Title X and Medicaid expansion, which are critical sources of public funding for contraceptive services.

Evidence from California suggests that Title X-funded clinics are associated with an increase in LARC use. In Colorado, an already robust Title X network with a statewide model of reproductive health services facilitated the distribution of funds, expansion of programs, and growth of clinic capacity.

Title X clinics are vital sources of reproductive health care for many communities in the United States. According to the Guttmacher Institute, Title X-funded clinics serve 14 percent of all women who receive any contraceptive care, 25 percent of poor women receiving contraceptive services, and 36 percent of uninsured women receiving services.¹⁹ Evidence from California suggests that Title X-funded clinics are associated with an increase in LARC use.²⁰ In Colorado, an already robust Title X network with a statewide model of reproductive health services facilitated the distribution of funds, expansion of programs, and growth of clinic capacity.²¹

However, the future of Title X is uncertain. The Trump administration issued new regulations for federal Title X family planning funding.²² The regulations block funding to providers that also offer abortion services, and restrict abortion counseling and referrals, which Title X clinics were previously allowed to provide.²³ These restrictions could significantly reduce the number of providers that qualify for funding, with serious consequences for the communities that rely on Title X clinics for care,²⁴ such as the adolescents and young people served by Colorado's Title X network.

Medicaid is also a major source of funding for providers who care for low-income

communities. Medicaid accounted for 75 percent of total public expenditures on family planning in FY2015.²⁵ In Colorado, Medicaid proved significant for the success and sustainability of the Family Planning Initiative.²⁶ During the Initiative, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) was implemented, and Colorado expanded Medicaid. The ACA and Medicaid expansion together not only increased the population of insured patients, it facilitated a change in the business models of Title X clinics.²⁷

Critically, the Family Planning Initiative dedicated program funding for technical assistance to support clinics as they navigated a new, post-ACA world. It supported providers to correctly bill payers, conducted enrollment outreach activities, and ultimately changed their business model from “free” clinics to operations with diverse revenue streams comprised of multiple payers.²⁸

LARCS AND REPRODUCTIVE COERCION

Colorado received national attention for its success at reducing the adolescent pregnancy rate and for the state’s projected cost savings in public program expenditures.²⁹ However, this success, like any family planning program aimed at low-income communities, should be met with caution. If not carefully designed,

LARC promotion programs could invite bias and coercion.

Though Colorado garnered headlines for its program successes, the state’s basic approach is not unique: providing free, highly effective contraceptive methods to reduce adolescent pregnancy. Govern-

Governments continue to invest in teen pregnancy prevention efforts as a poverty intervention. This line of thinking positions poor, young women, and their fertility as the source of a social problem, while overlooking the economic, social, and cultural institutions and public policies that perpetuate poverty and racism.

ments and advocates have long heralded family planning investment for its potential to lower fertility rates and thus reduce poverty and improve health, economic, and educational outcomes for poor women and their families.³⁰ These attitudes reveal a widespread acceptance of fertility control as a legiti-

mate anti-poverty strategy.

However, the logic of this approach is unsettling in light of sterilization and population control policies that historically targeted communities of color and Native Americans. Evidence about the direct effect of early pregnancy and parenthood on educational and economic outcomes is unclear,³¹ yet governments continue to invest in teen pregnancy prevention efforts as a poverty intervention. This line of thinking positions poor, young women, and their fertility as the source of a social problem, while overlooking the economic, social, and cultural institutions and public policies that perpetuate poverty and racism.

Coercive sterilization was practiced

throughout the United States at least until the 1970s,³² targeting women with disabilities or serious mental illness, and low-income women of color, especially Black, Latina, and Native women.³³ Reversible methods have also been wielded coercively. When the contraceptive Norplant was approved in 1990, some state lawmakers attempted to pass legislation that would incentivize or even mandate Norplant use among women who received public assistance.³⁴

The targeted control of low-income women's fertility continues today in insidious, and no less racialized, forms. For example, "welfare family caps"—state-level policies which deny benefits to families who have additional children while receiving public assistance—still existed in 17 states as of 2016.³⁵ Reproductive health policies and programs that emphasize "public costs averted" through pregnancy prevention—a success that Colorado's initiative celebrated—further stigmatize low-income women who rely on public assistance programs to support themselves and their families.

LARC PROMOTION PITFALLS: DISCRIMINATION, DIRECTIVE COUNSELING, AND REMOVAL

Publicly-funded contraceptive initiatives, particularly those centered around LARC methods, explicitly target populations at "high-risk" for unintended pregnancy (low-income young people and people of color). But Gomez, Fuentes, and Allina warn that targeting "high-risk" populations could lead to statistical discrimination, by "using epidemiologic data or previous clinic experiences to estimate a

particular woman's risk, without consideration of her unique history, preferences and priorities."³⁶ Black and Latinx people report experiencing racial discrimination when seeking reproductive health care; for instance, they are more likely to be pressured or advised to use contraceptives or restrict their fertility.³⁷

Furthermore, directive counseling could undermine patient choice. By promoting LARC methods over other contraceptive measures or emphasizing the effectiveness of LARCs above other criteria for choosing a contraceptive, providers risk infringing on reproductive autonomy, especially for patients who belong to communities historically targeted for fertility control.³⁸

Finally, access to LARC removal is of increasing concern to reproductive health and justice advocates. Patients face provider resistance when they wish to discontinue their LARC method early, while clinicians report mixed or negative feelings, even feeling they have "failed," when a patient requests early removal.³⁹ Young people of color and low-income young people, whose fertility and child-bearing are highly stigmatized, could be at particular risk of facing resistance from providers if they wish to discontinue their LARC method.⁴⁰

The removal problem is also embedded in public policy. In a study of state-level Medicaid policies, Vela et al. found that most state payment policies did not cover the costs of counseling, device removal, or follow-up care.⁴¹ Moreover, several state payment policies impose medical necessity restrictions on reimbursement

for removal procedures.⁴² Reimbursement restrictions effectively make early removal inaccessible for patients who rely on Medicaid. This is an unacceptable limit on reproductive autonomy. Young people who request early removal due to side effects, plans to use a different method, a desire to discontinue contraceptive use, or any other reason are effectively unable to do so in these states.⁴³

RECOMMENDATIONS

The potential for bias and coercion is not theoretical, but rather ingrained in public policies and program designs, however well-intentioned. Bridging lessons from the Colorado Family Planning Initiative—which leveraged a large private donation into a sustainable, statewide public investment in LARC access—with careful analysis of some of the problematic foundations of publicly-funded family planning, I offer broad recommendations for policymakers who may wish to replicate Colorado’s success.

1. Policies and programs aiming to increase access to LARCs must include strategies to facilitate LARC removal. States should ensure that their Medicaid payment policies capture the costs of all LARC-related services, including follow-up care and removal, without restrictions. Pilot initiatives providing no- or low-cost services to uninsured and low-income

communities should budget resources for early removal. Health departments should support safety-net providers to provide high-quality care and counseling that includes information about LARC removal procedures and costs. These added program costs may prove challenging to safety-net providers’ capacities and budgets. Therefore, reproductive health funders should consider increasing their investments. Still, providers with limited resources must consider the potential trade-off between providing truly comprehensive care and serving the greatest number of people.

Policymakers should avoid setting potentially coercive and stigmatizing targets such as increasing uptake, lowering adolescent birth rates, and averting the “costs” of young people’s fertility.

2. Policy and program goals should center patients. LARC uptake as the “default outcome”⁴⁴ or the measure of successful service provision could

fuel biased counseling. Policy and program goals should aim to improve LARC access and meet each patient’s sexual and reproductive health needs regardless of which contraceptive they choose. Policymakers should avoid setting potentially coercive and stigmatizing targets such as increasing uptake, lowering adolescent birth rates, and averting the “costs” of young people’s fertility. Anti-poverty strategies should tackle the holistic health, economic, social, and educational needs of young people, including young parents.

3. Policymakers and advocates should

defend public funding for sexual and reproductive health. Title X and Medicaid are critical sources of funding for safety-net clinics and the patients that rely on them. Policymakers should push back against proposed Title X funding restrictions and defend public health insurance for low-income, disabled, and undocumented immigrant communities. In states that have not adopted Medicaid expansion, advocates should explore new advocacy tools, including grassroots ballot initiatives, following recent successes in Nebraska, Idaho, and Utah. State governments should also search for innovative and sustainable financing mechanisms to maintain and increase funding for safety-net sexual and reproductive health programs.

4. **Decision makers should engage young people in policy and program design.** Policymakers should survey the community they intend to serve—especially young people—to understand specific unmet needs, goals, and values of clients, rather than inferring them only from population-level data. Policies and programs should facilitate respect for young people’s goals, values, and decisions about their reproductive lives and contraceptive choices. Program designers should link contraceptive access programs with programs that support pregnant and parenting young people, integrating reproductive health and social services.

CONCLUSION

Evidence shows that removing financial barriers to LARC methods dramatically improves access for young people. However, LARC promotion programs must properly balance public policy goals with reproductive justice values. Policymakers who are concerned about improving access to sexual and reproductive health for young people must approach LARC initiatives from a patient-centered and rights-based perspective.

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CUSTODIAL TORTURE: JUVENILE JUSTICE HOMES IN INDIA

by Devika Agrawal

CUSTODIAL TORTURE: JUVENILE JUSTICE HOMES IN INDIA

DEVIKA AGRAWAL

Edited by: Emily Estus and Nick Pesta

This paper explores the alarming accounts of child abuse within India's Juvenile Justice Homes (also known as observation homes, special homes, or children's homes)—a system designed around the principles of dignity, respect, and rehabilitation to secure the rights of vulnerable children. Relying on a combination of qualitative data analysis from interviews with field experts and limited quantitative surveys from observation homes, this paper seeks to understand the major breakdowns in accountability inside these homes. It argues that weak structural design, ambiguities created by excess government bodies, and poor infrastructural support are the main causes for the inequities within the system. These problems are further exacerbated by the rampant corruption within Indian politics, the economic impetus for that corruption, and the historical cultural norms around children.

INTRODUCTION

At the start of the new millennium, the Indian parliament crafted a landmark set of laws that govern the 440 million children across the country, today called the Juvenile Justice Act (JJA) of 2000.¹ The JJA's acknowledgement that all children, regardless of whether they are victims or perpetrators of crimes, are deserving of love, dignity, and rehabilitative opportunities was deemed revolutionary.² The new law took a giant leap away from the punitive treatment of juvenile offenders by mandating that individual states provide similar resources, protocols, and institutions that serve groups of children that have been traditionally separated by the government and by public opinion.

For instance, a notable aspect of this law is the mandatory creation of child care institutions in every district of the nation.

These spaces, often referred to as “children's homes,” shelter all children that might be needing governmental custody. This includes both children in need of care and protection (CNCP) — who might have been rescued from being lost, homeless, or trafficked — and children in conflict with the law (CICL) who have been accused of crime. These homes were designed to place a special emphasis on the eventual reintegration of all children into society — but as the title of this article might suggest, the reality is a far cry from any of these critical objectives.

The JJA appears strong on paper, but its implementation as a group of laws that govern almost a fifth of the world's child population needs to be tested. Over the last decade, research in different Indian states has shown that a majority of children in juvenile justice homes have been physically assaulted, often being whipped

by belts, hung from ceilings, or beaten into false confessions.³ There have been countless exposés of staff trafficking children into child labor and prostitution and even committing sexual assault.⁴ A recent audit by the Tata Institute for Social Sci-

ent of the boys had been sexually abused and five percent of them had exhibited physical signs of attempted suicide.¹²

It is not hyperbolic to suggest that India's juvenile justice system has perversely pro-




Figure 1: Juvenile Justice System Stakeholders
Source: Devika Agrawal

ences uncovered the beating, drugging, and rape of children in a home for destitute girls in the state of Bihar, a horror compounded by years of public silence and apathy.⁵ People living in the vicinity had repeatedly heard tortured cries at night, and many staff members who knew the grim details of the abuse remained silent because of “the might of the system.”⁶

Even ignoring such brazen trauma, the physical and mental health of most children in these homes is pitiful. A series of surprise inspections in recent times has revealed massively overcrowded rooms, regularized corporal punishment, watered-down meals with barely any nutrition, and forced sleep deprivation.^{7, 8, 9,}
¹⁰ Consequently, most children are malnourished and there is an alarmingly high incidence of anxiety, depression, and even suicide.¹¹ A recent study of juvenile justice homes in Delhi found that almost 40 per-

cent of the boys had been sexually abused and five percent of them had exhibited physical signs of attempted suicide.¹² It is not hyperbolic to suggest that India's juvenile justice system has perversely pro-

moted the custodial torture of children, especially those from some of the most marginalized socioeconomic groups. Most children in juvenile justice homes are either former street children, runaways, or those rescued from factories — all from the bottom of India's complex socioeconomic matrix. The authors of a study on juvenile justice homes in the state of Madhya Pradesh concluded, “Even a cursory look at the names of apprehended CICL shows that the majority of them are either Muslim or lower-caste Hindus.”¹³

Despite the colossal public health implications for select socioeconomic groups, there is an absence of research being conducted by the government or external policy institutions, which has restricted any serious country-wide analysis of the problem. As a result, the global human rights community has remained largely unaware of the scale and import of this crisis, result-

ing in little international pressure on India to meaningfully address the issue.

This essay hopes to bridge these gaps in information by exploring the question: What are the main causes for the continued rampant child abuse within India's child care institutions? To answer this, I rely on a combination of interviews with some of India's leading activists in the field and small-scale NGO-collected data to closely examine the key stakeholders of the juvenile justice system as well as the larger social, political, and economic push factors.

While it is specifically mentioned that "In no case shall a juvenile in conflict with law be placed in a police lockup or lodged in a jail," the police scarcely adhere to this rule.

OUTLINING THE SYSTEM, STAKEHOLDERS, AND DESIGN FLAWS

Children in the juvenile justice system interact with a range of stakeholders that each play an important role in the proliferation of this crisis. Given the JJA's mandate to provide equal treatment to every child under one umbrella institution, victims and perpetrators move through the system in similar steps, encountering practically identical governmental bodies along the way. These bodies have undertaken the responsibility of assessing each case with due diligence, providing uninterrupted custodial care, and eventually releasing children with follow-up mechanisms for future support. This section walks us through the key contributions of each stakeholder within the system and the potential causes for their inaction in the face of child abuse.

POLICE

The police are the first point of contact for most children before they step into child care institutions. Each district of the country is mandated to have a Special Juvenile Police Unit (SJPU) — a body of police officers that are specifically trained in child rights — who must file initial cases and bring children forward to their first committee hearing within 24 hours.¹⁴

While most states do not even have the requisite SJPU outlined by the law, the vast majority of SJPU's are poorly trained and remain ignorant of the JJA.¹⁵

This preliminary interaction sets the tone for what India's most vulnerable children are to expect for the remainder of their time in government custody. It is not unusual to hear cases of physical abuse and mistreatment at the police station, even before their official registration within the system. While it is specifically mentioned that "In no case shall a juvenile in conflict with law be placed in a police lockup or lodged in a jail,"¹⁶ the police scarcely adhere to this rule. A study of observation homes and special homes across Maharashtra found that amongst the CICL who had been interviewed, 65 percent were kept in the lock-up ranging for a timespan of 2–13 days.¹⁷ While the study also found that the police behaved affectionately with CNCP, often offering them food or spending money from their own pockets, CICL were treated abusively. Sixty-seven percent of CICL had reportedly been

slapped, 30 percent were beaten severely, 32 percent had been whipped with a belt, 15 percent had been hung from the ceiling, and 1.7 percent had been sexually abused.¹⁸ Qualitative evidence has revealed multiple case studies where children have been restrained in jails, underfed, or beaten into confessions, predominantly affecting boys from underprivileged backgrounds.¹⁹ Many children refrain from speaking out on these experiences because they have been threatened by the police into silence.

As far as the causes for such maltreatment go, state governments are perfectly aware of this widespread phenomena and argue that this is the result of “inadequate training,” a “lack of clarity on determination of age among police officers for children in conflict with law,” “no fit facility to house CNPC and CICL between sunset and sunrise,” and a “reluctance to release CICL on bail due to social pressure from [the] victim’s kin, media, etc.”²⁰ While many of their excuses are grounded in infrastructural limitations or widespread demands for retributive justice over rehabilitative justice (following the infamous 2012 gang-rape case involving underage offenders), it is important to note the cultural dimensions of this problem and the historical acceptance and normalization of violence against children across India.

For generations, the physical and psychological abuse of children has been permissible by cultural beliefs and purported

economic constraints, such as “the need for child marriage” or superstitions that “sex with a young virgin” can cure sexually transmitted diseases.²¹ Acts of violence like slapping or the twisting of ears are routine, and children are often expected to engage in laborious activities from a young age

A quick glance at international statistics shows that “India has the world’s largest number of sexually abused children, with... one in every 10 children sexually abused at any point in time.”

to contribute towards the family income. A quick glance at international statistics shows that “India has the world’s largest number of sexually abused children, with a child below 16 years raped every 155th minute, a child below 10 every 13th hour, and one in every 10 children sexually abused at any point in time. India also has the largest number of missing children.”²² These social and cultural patterns invariably translate into the weak implementation of safety standards for children within the system. Moreover, the socialization of communities into a culture that upholds violence as a natural tool to control behaviors provides little incentive for children or their families to report these violations of their human rights — much less to view them as such.

CHILD WELFARE COMMITTEES AND JUVENILE JUSTICE BOARDS

After their cases have been registered by the police, the two groups of children have to face different legal committees with magisterial powers to determine their short- and long-term outcomes; this may be sending them back to their families, arranging for counseling, or declaring

them guilty. “Committees are essentially the gatekeepers of the system,” says Ms. Suparna Gupta, the director of Aangan. “They are empowered to deal exclusively amongst themselves and are the final authority with regard to cases for the care, protection, treatment, development and rehabilitation of children.” CNCP meet with Child Welfare Committees (CWCs) while CICL meet with Juvenile Justice Boards (JJBs).

While CWCs and JJBs are the most crucial legal powers in these children’s journeys, there have been an endless number of cases where these committees simply do not show up, leaving children to languish in the system while awaiting their trials — reportedly anywhere from two weeks to six months.²³ For example, CWCs of four Punjab districts sit on a quarterly basis while the remaining meet once a month. Many CWC members across Karnataka were found to be heading NGOs, serving in various government sectors, or running professional consultancies — jobs which can be quite demanding in terms of both time and energy.²⁴ The National Commission for Protection of Child Rights found that only 516 of the 660 districts have established their CWCs, and among these, the membership is majority male and over the age of 65.²⁵ At the very worst end of the spectrum, numerous CWC and JJB members were found to have sexually assaulted minors in the privacy of their

cubicles during purported legal proceedings.²⁶ The committee members’ busy schedules, part-time jobs, and the general lack of diversity among staff presents huge problems for the legal judgements being made on behalf of children. This can be attributed to the fundamental design flaws within the JJA.

According to the law, members of each district’s CWC and JJB are selected by state governments. Prima facie, the localized decision-making power seems crucial given the varying needs across India’s many ethnically diverse states. But instead of electing qualified sociologists, psychologists, and child care specialists (as dictated by the JJA)²⁷ — the state invariably elects political appointees who have little to no experience in the realization of child rights. As explained by Enakshi Ganguly²⁸, one of the co-founders of HAQ Center for Child Rights in New Delhi,

“People who need to be gratified politically are placed in these roles.” Ultimately, state governments see CWCs and JJBs as low-priority jobs that can be handed off to various political henchmen as some sort of remuneration for their campaigning services.

But instead of electing qualified sociologists, psychologists, and child care specialists (as dictated by the JJA) — the state invariably elects political appointees who have little to no experience in the realization of child rights.

One might pause and ask: Why would committee membership be so deeply coveted by political appointees, and how would they be “gratified” by such immense responsibility over the lives of children? One way to understand the various di-

mensions of this problem is to analyze the socio-political incentives that drive these stakeholders. Ms. Bharti Ali,²⁹ another leading activist in the field and co-director of HAQ Center for Child Rights, argues that the positions on CWCs and JJBs have grown in popularity because of the magisterial powers that come along with them. Even just the ability to flaunt their newfound power in the districts where they work can translate into many other benefits, open doors, and lead to social standing to negotiate more power. This political phenomenon mirrors the professional motivations of most other government employees in a variety of sectors, such as education. With the promise of a stable job, low-levels of accountability, and access to a plethora of external benefits like pensions and health insurance, important positions of power in the social development of the nation have been overrun with citizens trying to establish a place for themselves within a challenging, unforgiving economy.

Another important factor that derails the performance of CWCs and JJBs is the general lack of fiscal and human resources. Approximately 0.04 percent of the total national budget has been allocated for child protection, and only a slice of that amount gets earmarked for child care institutions.³⁰ Dozens of reports on the juvenile justice system admit to the dearth of infrastructural resources, the pittance travel allow-

Dozens of reports on the juvenile justice system admit to the dearth of infrastructural resources, the pittance of travel allowances that prevent committee members from actually commuting to their hearings, and the incredibly low salaries that disincentivize honest, hard work.

ances that prevent committee members from actually commuting to their hearings, and the incredibly low salaries that disincentivize honest, hard work.³¹ Child Welfare Officers and Juvenile Justice Board members are barely remunerated for their time, as they are given “honorariums” of less than \$10 a sitting. While “ideally, the honorarium amount should not be too high so as to replace the position of a regular salary,” the running amount has been considered trivial and professionally debilitating.³²

PROBATION OFFICERS

Pending the inquiry by their judicial committees, children are placed in a specific juvenile justice home, depending on the nature of their entry into the system. Orphans or victims of trafficking are often placed in “children’s homes” that are run by missionaries or NGOs, while children in violation of the law are often placed in “observation homes” or “special homes,” which tend to have a more rehabilitative focus.³³ While that is what the law mandates, most homes across the country rarely adhere to these divisions. Children are frequently misallocated, resulting in uncomfortable groupings of victims and offenders across all ages and genders.³⁴ Once children have been placed in government custody, their direct channel of communication with their adjudicating committees and their families are Probation Of-




Figure 2: Number of Children in the Juvenile Justice System as a Proportion of Children in India
Source: Devika Agrawal with Data from the Ministry of Women and Child Development

ficers (POs). Essentially their personalized caseworkers, POs are staff-members of the juvenile justice home, entrusted with attending to all the physical and socioemotional needs of the child. POs learn and record each child’s personal history, provide avenues for education and play, and importantly, they follow up with the child after their release from the institution.³⁵

Unfortunately, as is consistent with the larger failures of the system, this is not the reality of what POs actually do. Given the national and state-wide restrictions on funding, there simply is not enough capacity for POs to allocate the care and attention needed to learn about each child or to follow up with them after their release. A considerable challenge within this landscape is the reality that India is a geographically massive country, with

an equally massive population to protect under the system. With a minimum requirement of one observation home per district (which is a gigantic entity, sometimes covering 11 million people)³⁶ juvenile justice homes face the risk of being overcrowded, understaffed, and too under-resourced to provide even basic resources like food, bedding, or a change of clothes.³⁷ In the case of Maharashtra, for example, the child-to-PO ratio is 139:1, while the legally prescribed ratio is 33:1.³⁸

Ms. Suparna Gupta — the founder and director of Aangan, an NGO that works to reform over six hundred juvenile justice homes across the country — argues that this lack of funding has created a vicious cycle of vulnerability for children. “When there are mass raids in factories by NGOs like Pratham, they bring about 100

kids back to the home, and they will just be parked there because there is no place for them — not even to stretch your legs and sleep. So there are all these exhausted children, and then there is the pressure to say, ‘look at their health, let’s quickly send them home,’ and they get sent back into this cycle of being trafficked. In a lot of districts, one home is just not enough.”

While family reunification is generally the most desired outcome, this can be an extremely dangerous option without a thorough home assessment. A recent study that examines the child-trafficking pathway from Bihar to Rajasthan found that the infrastructural problems within the juvenile justice system have exacerbated the potential for children to be re-trafficked. By surveying various POs across multiple districts in Bihar, they found “hugely divergent responses as to whether a home verification report is conducted,” and that “respondents stated that thorough assessments of the potential risks and suitability of a family environment ‘do not physically happen.’”³⁹ The fact that most children come from low-income, rural, or migrant families presents a particular challenge for POs to ascertain their family situations within their limited budgets. Given a lack of home assessments, coupled with growing pressure for deinstitutionalization, children are acutely vulnerable to being exploited.

The severe underestimation of what it costs to protect India’s children has forced

the government to cut corners where they can, leaving POs with little support on the ground. They have dissolved important job vacancies within child care institutions and have been filling vacant positions with underpaid contractual workers.⁴⁰

Finally, similar to the selection process of committee members, the manner in which POs are appointed breeds a systematic indifference towards the protection of child rights. Aangan’s mixed-methods study on POs across Maharashtra found that there was no formal process by which they were entrusted with this job.⁴¹ More than half of

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the POs surveyed had not even applied for the position but were arbitrarily transferred to fill vacancies within the district. As a result, they had little to no expertise in counseling, mentoring, or evaluating the socio-psychological needs of chil-

dren.

Given the unpredictable nature of their appointments, POs scarcely receive training to prepare for the immense amount of responsibilities that are thrust upon them. A PO working in an NGO-run institution for the last decade said that in all his years on the job, “I have never attended any training for any subject...we learn on the job.”⁴² As a consequence, there is a general sense of ignorance towards child rights and overwhelmingly negative assumptions about the need for rehabilitation. When asked about how they counsel the children in their custody, some PO’s responded that “counseling will not make

a difference if they are repeat offenders”⁴³ — touting the exact retributivist sentiments that the JJA sought to dismantle.

INSPECTION COMMITTEES

We have just outlined the three key stakeholders that children directly interact with — the police, the judicial committees, and their POs within the institutions. Our final stakeholder is one that has power over all the others within the system, entrusted with upholding professional ethics and accountability: inspection committees.

Inspection committees are mandated to “visit and oversee the conditions in the institutions and appropriateness of the processes for safety, wellbeing and permanence, review the standards of care and protection being followed by the institutions, [and] look out for any incidence of violation of child rights” at least once every three months.⁴⁴ However, inspection committees are arguably among the most ineffective stakeholders of the juvenile justice system. This is because the JJA mandates that inspectors must be members of “the State Commission for the Protection of Child Rights or the State Human Rights Commission, medical and other experts, voluntary organizations and reputed social workers.”⁴⁵ A close reading of this instruction reveals that committee members are essentially full-time employees in other institutions and in all likeli-

hood rarely have the time to do regular or thorough inspections.⁴⁶

Their lack of availability to fulfill their inspection duties is further complicated by the ongoing creation of multiple bodies who have the power to inspect and report injustices within child care institutions, creating ambiguity over who is accountable to whom. For example, inspection committees are tasked with inspection, but CWCs and JJBs also have the power to inspect and take action against any site.⁴⁷

Moreover, the central and state governments must also “monitor and evaluate the functioning of the children’s homes at time periods and through persons and institutions specified by that Government.”⁴⁸ While it might seem wise to allow multiple committees the ability to report their findings and take

legal action, giving various distinct bodies the exact same power comes with the risk of each committee relinquishing that job to someone else. Ms. Ganguly has found that, “There are so many bodies who are responsible at any given point in time. The institutions will say that the CWC does not report enough, and the CWC will look towards the inspection committees, and so it goes.” Even the Ministry of Women and Child Development, which is the federal body in charge of all vulnerable children, admits to the confusion within the question of accountability.

Another structure that complicates ac-

A close reading of this instruction reveals that committee members are essentially full-time employees in other institutions and in all likelihood rarely have the time to do regular or thorough inspections.

countability is the legal involvement of external organizations who volunteer to run children’s homes. Ms. Gupta finds that when the state has clear management of the home, it’s much easier to hold someone accountable. She has been openly critical of multilateral organizations like UNICEF entering the justice system and undertaking governmental responsibilities when they are not ultimately held accountable by anyone. One of the things

that the mistreatment of children across juvenile justice homes has been an ongoing, permitted phenomena due to four factors: flimsy infrastructural support in the form of economic and human resources, inefficient selection criteria for jobs that are immensely important, sociocultural tendencies that lean towards political corruption and the physical exploitation of children, and a total sense of ambiguity over who is responsible for upholding the system.



Figure 3: Number of Children Vulnerable to Custodial Abuse in India Compared to Country Populations
Source: Devika Agrawal with Data from Worldometers

Ms. Gupta has been advocating for is the recognition that regardless of the management, children are always legally in government custody, and there needs to be a clear body of inspectors that can hold state and non-state actors accountable on a regular basis.

CONCLUSION: SOCIAL IMPLICATIONS AND FINAL RECOMMENDATIONS

Viewing the system in its entirety, we see

All these push factors — and a long list of others too intricate and disheartening to mention in this article — intersect with each other to create the amalgamation of buildings, committees, and individuals that have brought immense harm upon approximately 40 million children within the system.

What’s most unsettling about this failure in public policy (and failure in human rights) is the sheer quantity of children that are being implicated from impover-

ished, lower-caste, and Muslim communities. Considering the main demographics that are vulnerable to entering juvenile justice homes reveals how the system ultimately institutionalizes neglect and oppression of specific subgroups of Indian society — those that have been pushed to the fringes of political participation, social equality, and economic opportunity for as long as their communities can remember. The government has essentially created a reinforcing mechanism for socioeconomic deprivation where children of marginalized communities enter the system, experience abuse, and face increasing risks of remaining marginalized after their eventual release from these homes. This demographic salience has also meant that political elites have been lukewarm at best towards seizing the issue and pushing the conversation as a national priority.

The government has essentially created a reinforcing mechanism for socioeconomic deprivation where children of marginalized communities enter the system, experience abuse, and face increasing risks of remaining marginalized after their eventual release from these homes.

Any public outrage after media exposure of specific sexual assault cases in child-shelters has been sporadic and passing, perhaps even fueling the impression of systemic change without any meaningful political action. A 2007 study found that, “In the last four years, on an average, only 2.7 percent of the questions asked in Parliament by members related to children” and that “60 percent of these questions were on education.”⁴⁹

It follows, then, that raising widespread public awareness about this issue is a critical solution that might garner more polit-

ical support for a costly systemic overhaul. As Enakshi Ganguly insightfully noted, “Today, we are not doing social policy based on the principles of non-discrimination and enhancing dignity anymore. Because social change is also measured in the same way that corporate change is measured, we see that investments in social policy will never yield immediate returns. That’s how we’re in this mess — nobody has the patience to really build the system ground-up.”⁵⁰ Beyond just articles in the media — which only target a small segment of India’s literate (and typically elite) population — public information campaigns that inspire a sense of outrage among the communities most affected are vital to change. Films, TV shows, and school curricula could start including figures on the magnitude of this crisis, using anonymized case-studies about

the experiences of children within the system. NGOs could collaborate with popular public figures who are widely known and viewed by all demographics of Indians, thereby generating political support through their endorsements. The Indian government has historically capitalized on the general illiteracy and ignorance of its citizens as a means to uphold the status quo, which is why a strong public policy solution must also break this cycle.

Other policy fixes include changes in selection procedures for many of these stakeholders who have been given enor-

mous responsibilities over the lives of children. Disallowing states from picking their political supporters and mandating that positions of members on inspection committees, CWCs, and JJBs be fulltime positions would be fruitful, easy fixes that might encourage more oversight and professionalism within the system. But given that much of the institutional corruption can be attributed to sociocultural tendencies, all of these policies have to be implemented in tandem with long-term sociological solutions.

For example, our cultural perception of these children has not yet aligned with the facts of what brought them into the system to begin with. As exemplified by the probation officers' dismissive attitudes towards providing counseling, treatment of children across the country is still largely determined by the lack of understanding of the origins of their criminality. Studies on children's homes found that 10 percent have never been to school and 72.5 percent had already begun full-time work at the age of 14.⁵¹ In fact, the vast majority of these children are contributing as much as 40 percent of their family's income before being apprehended. This data reveals how children in India are prematurely thrust into adulthood, and thereby exposed to a plethora of vulnerabilities that place them in the system to begin with. "If you push young people into adulthood so early, they

Studies on children's homes have found that 10 percent have never been to school and 72.5 percent had already begun full-time work at the age of 14. In fact, the vast majority of these children are contributing as much as 40 percent of their family's income before being apprehended.

will behave like adults sans the cognitive ability to, and with whatever role models of adulthood around them," says Ms. Ganguly, who has been advocating for a radical shift in our discourse on juvenile delinquents. She argues that, "We are creating these terrible circumstances and then punishing them for it violently." A robust training program for police officers and probation officers on child rights (whilst transparently sharing data on the causes for their criminality) might be an effective way to kick-start these cultural shifts.

Finally, from an equity standpoint, one of the most important solutions might be simply to seek continuous feedback from the children within the system. By mandating a monthly feedback process, where children can freely speak their minds, we could simultaneously learn about their experiences of abuse, their individual contexts that brought them into the system, and possible solutions to help them remain safe.

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LEVERAGING LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARD CREDITS TO IMPROVE ELECTRIC VEHICLE RATE DESIGN

by Caroline Palmer

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LEVERAGING LOW CARBON FUEL STANDARDS TO IMPROVE ELECTRIC VEHICLE RATE DESIGN

CAROLINE PALMER

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The California Public Utilities Commission has an opportunity to reconsider how regulated electric utilities spend the proceeds from selling their Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS) credits, given the program's recent expansion. The Commission must also address the economically inefficient retail rates that deviate from the social marginal cost of producing electricity. This article proposes and analyzes two policy alternatives that would spend the expanded LCFS funds by advancing both electric vehicle (EV) adoption and economically efficient rates. I compare a fixed electric bill credit to a per-unit discount to existing electric vehicle time-of-use rates. I find that the fixed credit is better than the per-unit discount across several criteria. I also recommend that California's state agencies make a concerted effort to improve data collection and consumer engagement around reporting EV ownership and monitoring EV driving and charging. Effective policymaking is far more difficult without this information.

INTRODUCTION

As regulator of California's investor-owned utilities, the California Public Utilities Commission (CPUC) ensures the safety and reliability of the state's electric service. The commission also controls how the cost of that service is collected from customers as "just and reasonable" rates, aiming to protect ratepayers from monopolistic providers while also encouraging those providers to operate efficiently. This "rate-of-return" regulation involves setting the price that utility customers pay for electricity. The economies of scale in electricity service that maintain utilities' marginal cost (MC) below their average cost have caused retail electricity rates in California (and many other states) to deviate substantially from the wholesale cost of electricity production, creating

economic inefficiency.

Economically inefficient electricity rates happen for multiple reasons. In an efficient market, for every additional unit of electricity consumed, customers should be paying the marginal cost of producing that power ($P = MC$). However, they currently pay much more than that during most of the day to cover the fixed costs of the electricity grid, such as poles and wires. Those fixed costs must be paid, but rolling them into retail rates distorts the price signal that would otherwise inform customer decisions about how much power to consume at what time. Economists have long documented the inefficiency of setting retail prices that obscure marginal costs to society.^{1, 2, 3} Most residential customers evidently cannot even perceive the marginal price of their own rates under

the widely-used increasing block pricing scheme (in which customers are sorted into discrete tiers based on usage and higher-use tiers are charged a higher rate). Evidence suggests customers see the average of the price tiers rather than the price of each additional unit, complicating any potential customer response.⁴ The CPUC must consider opportunities for making rates more transparent and much closer to the variable or marginal cost of electricity to consumers.

The CPUC has already taken a significant step in this direction with a 2015 decision. Residential customers will be switched by default onto time-of-use (TOU) pricing, meaning that they will face higher power prices at times of peak demand (for example between 4:00 - 9:00 p.m.). This can make rates more efficient because it addresses a separate inefficiency of the uniform, per-kilowatt-hour rate structure: the fact that marginal cost of generation and transmission varies dramatically by the time of day. An electricity supply curve reveals an increasing-cost industry in which high evening demand causes higher prices than does low nighttime demand. However, most residential customers never receive a price signal to change their behavior under an increasing block tier rate. With TOU rates, consumers will be able to perceive time differentiation and adjust their behavior accordingly. Although this change indicates the CPUC's interest in bringing rates closer to MC,

The CPUC must consider opportunities for making rates more transparent and much closer to the variable or marginal cost of electricity to consumers.

the TOU rates themselves will still remain well above marginal cost to collect the fixed costs of the grid, and more action is needed to bring rates closer to MC.

The CPUC must balance goals of reliable and efficient energy service with important statewide environmental priorities, such as increasing the use of electric vehicles (EVs). California's policymakers have implemented measures that reduce fossil fuel combustion and carbon dioxide emissions to address climate change. This includes increasing the number of EVs owned and operated in the state. In 2018, Governor Jerry Brown signed an executive order setting a state goal of at least 5 million zero-emission vehicles on California roads by 2030, dramatically increasing the former 2025 target of 1.5 million vehicles.⁵ The California Air Resources Board (CARB)'s recent Greenhouse Gas Inventory findings that California's transportation sector is the largest source of emissions in the state underscores the urgency of such action.

Emissions from transportation in fact increased 2 percent in 2016.⁶

The CPUC plays a key role in encouraging EV adoption by setting electricity rates (representing the cost of fuel for those vehicles) and regulating how investor-owned utilities spend the credit proceeds they earn through California's Low Carbon Fuel Standard (LCFS). The LCFS is a state regulation requiring a 20 percent reduction in the carbon intensity of California's transportation fuels by 2030. The

mandate is accompanied by a market for tradable credits based on fuel source emissions reductions, in which producers of low-carbon fuels earn credits that producers of high-carbon fuels must buy to meet their emissions targets under the mandate.

Electric utilities may earn credits for electric vehicle charging within their territories as long as they “use all credit proceeds to benefit current or future EV customers”.⁷ In 2014, the CPUC decided how electric utilities may spend those LCFS credit proceeds in order to boost EV utilization. The decision permits spending the money on reducing the upfront purchase cost of a vehicle or annually crediting EV customers’ utility bills.⁸ Recently, the CARB expanded the incentives for using electricity as a transportation fuel, allowing utilities to also earn credits for building new charging infrastructure.⁹

This paper frames the LCFS expansion and resulting IOU credits as an opportunity to of the economic problem of retail rate inefficiency. As electrification of transportation accelerates and the function of electric utilities evolves, the LCFS expansion creates a promising, politically-feasible occasion to address the inefficiencies in current rate design, by encouraging EV adoption through changes to the residential pricing structure for EV drivers. The lower the electricity bill for EV driving, the more incentive consumers have to switch to and to utilize EVs. If this can be achieved in a way that makes rates closer to marginal costs, it would be beneficial to both EV adoption and to effi-

ciency in electricity consumption.

ALTERNATIVES

The policy alternatives considered in this analysis are intended to frame a conversation about the best possible rate scheme, given the limitations of rate-of-return regulation and the political and institutional inertia of the current rate structure.

The LCFS expansion creates a window of opportunity for the CPUC to influence how utilities and ratepayers think about pricing.

While the most economically efficient outcome would be to charge all customers retail prices equal to the true social marginal cost (SMC) of electricity and assign a separate fee to ensure that the overall revenue

requirement is met, such a radical change is not feasible in the short term. Instead, the LCFS expansion creates a window of opportunity for the CPUC to influence how utilities and ratepayers think about pricing. The CPUC can start with those ratepayers who drive EVs, since distribution utilities are mandated to focus LCFS funds on their benefit. Therefore, these alternatives offer options to utilize expanded LCFS funds in ways that specifically relate to EV retail rates:

- **Status Quo:** Investor-owned utilities’ whole-house EV TOU rates
- **Alternative 1:** Subsidize EV customer bills via per-kWh discount
- **Alternative 2:** Subsidize EV customer bills via fixed monthly credits¹⁰

STATUS QUO: INVESTOR-OWNED UTILITIES’ WHOLE-HOUSE EV TOU RATES

Table 1: San Diego Gas & Electric's Electric Vehicle Rate Options (\$/kWh)

	<i>On-Peak (4:00-9:00pm every day)</i>	<i>Super Off-Peak (Midnight - 6:00am Weekdays; Midnight - 2:00pm Weekends & Holidays)</i>	<i>Off-Peak (All other hours)</i>
Summer			
EV-TOU*	0.53	0.23	0.28
EV-TOU 2	0.53	0.23	0.28
EV-TOU 5**	0.52	0.09	0.28
Winter			
EV-TOU*	0.25	0.23	0.24
EV-TOU 2	0.25	0.23	0.24

* Separately-metered EV and household consumption

** This rate comes with a \$16 monthly "basic service fee"

Each of California's three investor-owned utilities offers one or more special time-of-use rates for electric vehicle drivers. The LCFS policy directs the utilities to "provide rate options that encourage off-peak charging"¹¹ and these rates indeed set lower prices during periods of low demand. Even without targeted action by the CPUC to direct LCFS funds toward efficient retail rate remedies, it seems realistic to expect EV drivers to adopt special EV-TOU rates as TOU rates in general become mandatory across the state. Therefore, the alternatives presented in this analysis will be considered in comparison to EV-TOU rates rather than in comparison to California's traditional increasing-block pricing methodology. As an example, Table 1 presents San Diego Gas & Electric's (SDG&E) EV-TOU options.

Each of the IOUs offers the option to meter and bill EV electricity consumption separately; that is, to have different rate schedules for kilowatt-hours (kWh) consumed by the household and by the vehicle. This paper makes the practical assumption that most users will not have

separate meters for their vehicle but will rather participate in a "whole-house" rate that treats all consumption according to the same rate schedule. From an economic standpoint, the whole-house rate makes sense because the cost of electricity at a given time is the same no matter how someone uses it. Therefore, power consumed by home appliances and power consumed by an EV battery ought to face the same price if consumed at the same time and on the same property.

EV drivers are unlikely to utilize a separate meter for financial reasons as well. Installing a new meter is costly and can require electrical updates. PG&E, for example, charges a \$100 service fee for a second meter and estimates that a customer will have to spend an additional \$2,000 to \$8,000 to purchase the new technology.¹²

ALTERNATIVE 1: SUBSIDIZE EV CUSTOMER BILLS VIA PER-KWH DISCOUNT

One way to incentivize EV adoption while addressing inefficiently high retail rates would be for utilities to use LCFS

funds to offer customers a discount per kWh of consumption. To calculate the magnitude of the discount, utilities would divide their total LCFS credit proceeds by the total kWh consumed by EVs in their territory. Each kWh would be credited at that rate on the customer's monthly bill if the customer is paying the EV rate. Whole-house EV-TOU rates, however, would obscure how much of the household load can truly be attributed to EVs – a problem, as subsidizing an entire household's energy consumption does not clearly reward and incentivize EV ownership.

There could also be an egregious equity issue at hand: Applying this discount to an entire house would reward customers differently who consume different amounts of electricity that have nothing to do with their EV demand. Although consumption patterns can vary widely within income groups, lower-income EV users might generally have lower overall household electric consumption, meaning they would receive a smaller monthly discount than would larger consumers. Different allocations would end up being made between apartment-renters versus large homeowners or single versus multi-member households, even if their EV driving and charging behavior is similar.

Clearly, policymakers need to find a way to distinguish EV demand in order to avoid promoting a potentially regressive policy. CARB has issued guidance on how to estimate the consumption of non-metered residential vehicle charging. To do so, the agency recognizes that some EV users will inevitably use a separate meter for measuring EV charging. If this holds true, utilities are supposed to assume that the average daily consumption of non-metered EVs in their territories is equal to that of the metered EVs.¹³ CARB calculates the number of non-metered EVs in each service territory based on the California Vehicle Rebate Project database, and California Depart-

ment of Motor Vehicles registration data. This information somewhat resolves the issue of how much whole-household consumption a utility can attribute specifically to the EV at that household. It would certainly also be helpful to utilities for ensuring that those EV owners register for one of the EV-specific rates as well.

Under time-varying rates, there is an opportunity to further calibrate the way a per-kWh discount is allocated, in order to better align with social marginal cost. The retail price in some EV-TOU periods may deviate more from the true average SMC in that period than in others. Off-peak retail rates might be further from off-peak SMC than on-peak rates are from the on-peak SMC. The CPUC could assign discounts proportionally to ensure that rates in each period be the same percentage higher than MC. Although this would require an extremely complicated methodology, it serves the purpose of more closely matching rates to marginal costs, and therefore it is the policy alternative considered here. By incorporating time-differentiated discounts, this proposal also notably evolves the CPUC's 2014 rate reduction option and evaluation.

ALTERNATIVE 2: SUBSIDIZE EV CUSTOMER BILLS VIA FIXED MONTHLY CREDITS

A different way to incentivize EV adoption and mitigate inefficiently high retail rates would be offering customers a fixed monthly bill credit using LCFS funds. Utilities would calculate the credit by dividing their total LCFS credits by the number of EV rate accounts. Unlike the per-kWh discount, this would not separate electricity utilized for EV charging, instead assigning a uniform credit across EV rate users. This methodology, therefore, would align with the assumption that most EV drivers do not separately meter residential EV consumption.

A bill credit could occur monthly or bi-annually, symmetric with the California Climate Credit. Utilities that already distribute climate dividends should not have difficulty allocating LCFS dividends to EV owners. A larger biannual credit may increase ratepayer awareness compared to a smaller monthly distribution, especially if the utility publicizes the larger, less frequent incentive. However, a case exists for selecting a monthly credit.

Like the per-kWh discount, the monthly bill credit could differ across customers. In the CPUC's 2014 proceeding, PG&E suggested distributing an annual credit based on vehicle battery size, but General Motors challenged the idea that battery size accurately correlates with vehicle miles travelled and associated charging needs. A monthly credit could also vary across types of users, for example, based on consumption brackets of 0-1000kWh, 1001-2000kWh, and so on. However, I recommend rejecting this proposal since a core purpose of the incentive is rewarding each recipient for buying an EV, which may not relate to total household electric consumption.

CRITERIA

This paper considers three criteria when evaluating the stated policy alternatives:

- Economic Efficiency
- Impact on EV Adoption (Effectiveness)
- Equity

ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY

Interpreting the economic efficiency of

each policy alternative requires determining its welfare cost as a function of how far rates under that policy deviate from the true social marginal cost (SMC). Therefore I first discuss why the existing EV-TOU rate structure is already quite far from the SMC.

It is difficult to precisely measure SMC for an entire state or even for a single utility service territory in California. This becomes particularly complicated when seeking values for the different periods under a time-varying rate. SMC changes frequently, by location, by time of day, and by season. The marginal cost of power can be approximated using the competitive wholesale price of electricity, which represents the variable fuel cost of generation. Friedman uses North American Electric Reliability Corporation data from 2009 to estimate the off-peak marginal cost of US electricity rates.¹³ Friedman adds 13 percent% to the locational marginal price to approximate marginal ancillary services and distribution expenses, ultimately concluding that the April-June 2009 off-peak MC of power in California averaged 2.240 cents per kilowatt-hour.¹⁴

More recently, Borenstein and Bushnell again estimate the social marginal cost of electricity across the country.¹⁵ They find the average wholesale power price for California's Independent System Operator control area to be 3.386 cents per kWh. After incorporating distribution line losses and omitting capacity costs and ancillary service costs, they calculate the average private marginal cost per kWh as falling between 3.2 and 4.6 cents. The authors also account for pollution externalities to determine the social marginal cost,

calculating the hourly emissions damage of power generation regressed on load to identify the change in emissions in response to change in load. They conclude that the average social marginal cost per kWh in most parts of the state is under 6.5 cents.

Both of these marginal cost measurements indicate that California EV drivers on EV-TOU rates are paying well above the incremental cost of electricity. This is not surprising since the rates are explicitly designed to collect both fixed costs and marginal costs. Most of the SDG&E rates shown in Table 1 charge winter off-peak and on-peak prices over 15 cents higher than Borenstein and Bushnell’s average SMC, and SDG&E summer rates are even higher. Southern California Edison’s two-period EV-TOU rate, which charges 13 cents during off-peak and 37 cents during summer peak (24 cents during winter peak) is also clearly well above SMC.

One might expect the SDG&E rate, which offers customers a much lower super off-peak price in exchange for a \$16 fixed cost (EV-TOU-5), to better approximate SMC. However, the super off-peak price is more than six cents higher than Friedman’s super off-peak estimate. From an efficiency standpoint, even the EV-TOU rate that comes closest to the theoretically optimal pricing structure is still deeply inefficient in terms of the price signal it sends to consumers. When consumers do not face accurate prices, they will not

allocate their consumption choices accordingly. Therefore, the status quo itself scores poorly on economic efficiency.

As for the policy alternatives, the per-kWh discount at first appears to be a great choice. Because the discount lowers the per-kWh rates, it brings them closer to marginal cost in the short run. Figure 1 demonstrates this efficiency gain. P0 represents the initial equilibrium price, or current electric retail rates. PLCFS represents

the discounted per-kWh price, and PMC represents the SMC social marginal cost. Bringing rates down with a volumetric discount increases efficiency equivalent to the

roughly triangular area below the demand curve between PLCFS and the vertical dotted line coming from P0. Bringing rates all the way down to marginal cost would also yield further economic efficiencies equivalent to the additional area under the demand curve.

While these short-run welfare gains are appealing, they only manifest for a certain portion of the ratepayers: those who own EVs and utilize EV rates. While lowering the rates for EVs serves the objective of bringing some rates closer to MC, the optimal efficiency gain needed in the electricity sector requires all rates to be closer to MC.¹⁶ On principle, it is ill-advised to only achieve these gains for a single group – ill-advised enough to deter this analysis from recommending the per-kWh discount.

When consumers do not face accurate prices, they will not allocate their consumption choices accordingly.

A fixed monthly credit, on the other hand, does not move rates away from the initial equilibrium price of P_0 . There are therefore none of the short-run efficiency gains from this alternative that there were from the per-kWh discount. In the long run, however, one would still expect efficiency gains from this policy alternative because it more closely approximates the idealized rate design that decomposes charges into fixed and variable elements. Receiving a monthly credit familiarizes customers and utilities with the idea that bills have a fixed component that could vary for different reasons. In fact, customers are already accepting the idea of a fixed bill charge by registering for SDG&E's EV-TOU-5 option; 1,011 customers have already opted into this rate.¹⁷


If the monthly credit policy alternative influences even more customers to start familiarizing themselves with fixed bill components, this could be an interim step to getting rates closer to MC, which will ultimately require a fixed charge. In this

way, the monthly credit is a more economically efficient option than the per-kWh discount, and I accordingly rank the discount as a (-) and the bill credit as a (+).

IMPACT ON EV ADOPTION

Judging the effectiveness of the policy alternatives requires determining whether more EVs will be bought and utilized based on whether kWh rates or overall monthly bills decline. The status quo EV-TOU rates are unlikely to cause EV adoption as they are so similar to normal default TOU rates. One might not expect much difference between a fixed credit and a per-kWh discount because they should both ultimately yield customers roughly the same savings. If EV owners all drove similar mileage and the per-kWh discount could accurately capture that utilization, then the total LCFS funds divided by kWh consumed as mileage would give the same savings when dispersed evenly across drivers as would a monthly bill credit equal to the LCFS funds divided

Figure 1: Short-Run Efficiency Gains from a Per-kWh Bill Discount



by EV owner.

However, lower EV rates would theoretically encourage more EV charging than a fixed bill credit would, if consumers respond to marginal price signals. Increased EV charging achieves the stated LCFS purpose of reducing the carbon intensity of transportation fuels. The utilities have incentive to support this outcome, due to the increased electricity throughput. However, more electricity consumption has associated emissions; electricity may produce lower emissions than gasoline vehicle miles traveled, but policymakers may still be concerned about this outcome in a climate-conscious era.

From a consumer awareness perspective, neither a monthly credit nor a per-kWh discount is likely to stand out on an electric bill. Neither mechanism is very visible to consumers as just another line item on the utility bill; ratepayers will simply look at the total price and pay it. One benefit


of the monthly bill credit option is that it is more tangible and easy to understand. A per-kWh discount is complicated for EV buyers to measure the magnitude of their credit. Understanding how much the credit will offset an EV purchase over the vehicle’s lifetime is important for the incentive to function properly. Even if the utility sums up the cumulative value of the discount every month to emphasize the value of the policy, it is certainly complicated for the consumer to understand.

Given the generally unconvincing effectiveness of either policy alternative, I rank the kWh discount as a (+), due to its potential to increase EV charging, and the fixed credit as neutral.

EQUITY

Incentivizing electric vehicle adoption and utilization generally raises equity concerns, as the costlier technology may be prohibitive to lower-income drivers. It

Figure 2: SDG&E’s 2018 Residential TOU Default Dashboard



Customers Currently on Residential TOU Plans

Plan	Customers
TOU-DR1 ¹	86,793
TOU-DR2 ²	21,508
DRSES	17,905
EVTOU2	12,160
TOU-DRP	8,397
TOU-DR	3,073
EVTOU5	1,011
DR-TOU	990
EVTOU	364
Total	152,201

would be reasonable to specifically target rebates toward residents in disadvantaged communities or toward those enrolled California’s discounted electric rates program. Since LCFS credits for EV charging are generated by existing EV drivers, the policy specifically directs the credits back toward those same drivers. Therefore, this section examines equity as it relates to the people who generated the LCFS credits.

Alternative 1, the kWh discount for whole-house metering, may not improve equity. As mentioned earlier, if the utility cannot reasonably isolate electricity consumed as vehicle fuel (which would be extremely difficult to achieve on the whole-house meter), it would subsidize other household consumption in addition to EV charging, thereby allocating LCFS credit proceeds away from their mandated purpose. Referring again to the EV uptake rates in Figure 2, the 12,160 SDG&E customers who have a single meter clearly outnumber the 364 customers who have a separate EV meter. This discrepancy means that the per-kWh discount, even if it utilized the CARB’s recommended methodology for estimating non-metered EV usage, will be based on a very small sample size and will likely be distorted. This alternative suddenly appears very similar to a fixed credit due to the difficulty of precisely measuring EV consump-

tion as it is simply a value averaged across most EV users.

A fixed credit may have the opposite problem, in that all customers will receive the same credit regardless of how much they utilize an EV. This may fail to reward increases in consumption of electricity as transportation fuel, a goal of the LCFS program. Given that the per-kWh discount effectively becomes a fixed credit after averaging across the non-metered EV users, however, I choose to rank both policy alternatives as a (-).

CONCLUSION

The CPUC currently has the opportunity to rethink the way utilities spend the proceeds from their LCFS credits. Given the economic inefficiency of retail rates set far above the SMC social marginal cost, the CPUC must also focus on the long-term goal of bringing all rates closer to SMC. I propose a set of policy alternatives in which the agency can address both objectives at once.

Below, I summarize the qualitative rankings of the two policy alternatives according to the three criteria analyzed in this paper. All criteria were weighed equally; efficiency was not given special treatment given that it is not as prominent a goal of

Table 3: Evaluation of Alternatives (Relative to the Status Quo)

	<i>Economic Efficiency</i>	<i>EV Adoption (Effectiveness)</i>	<i>Equity</i>	<i>Total</i>
Per-kWh Discount	-	+	-	Neutral
Fixed Monthly Credit	+	Neutral	-	+

the LCFS as is EV adoption.

Ultimately, I recommend the fixed credit over the per-kWh discount. While the volumetric discount is an expedient way of getting EV rates closer to MC, it is not the efficient principled to improve just one group of electric rates when the overarching goal must be to get all rates closer to SMC. The fixed credit, on the other hand, could acclimate customers to bills with fixed components, which could pave the way for the future fixed costs that would necessarily accompany marginal-cost prices. None of the other criteria strongly influences the decision for one policy alternative over the other except for the potential effectiveness of the per-kWh credit to increase EV charging and, therefore, EV utilization.

In addition to this recommended policy, some additional improvements will strengthen the nexus between electric vehicle adoption and efficient electricity rates necessary for successful policy-making. Fundamental assumptions of this paper include that EV drivers are using EV rates effectively; that they know about those rates, that they have chosen to enroll in them, and that the utilities accurately track EVs in their service territories due to the rate utilization. The 2014 CPUC proceeding identified that EV drivers are often not on these rates and that utilities may not know that non-metered EVs even exist unless a customer notifies the utility when requesting a rebate. The utilities and agencies involved in LCFS must work with the California Department of Motor Vehicles DMV to identify non-metered vehicles. Even if the utilities better track the number of EVs in their territory, de-

termining charging behavior of individual EV drivers is still a challenge. This limits the per-kWh discount policy alternative, and it is critical for measuring LCFS credits accurately in general. In addition to recommending that the Commission adopt the monthly bill credit policy alternative, I also strongly recommend that the state dedicate resources to tracking EV ownership and usage in California. Improved data will allow agencies and utilities to incentivize EV uptake across the state more effectively.

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10. Notably absent from this list of methods to incentivize EV adoption is the idea of upfront purchase rebates. Providing rebates would be a very reasonable alternative for spending the LCFS proceeds, as the CPUC decided in 2014. An upfront rebate is especially appealing with regard to the goal of EV uptake, as it addresses the bounded rationality of people who would benefit from EV ownership in the long run but are stopped by the “sticker shock” of the capital cost. However, as this paper focuses on using LCFS funds to increase efficiency in rate design as a primary goal, rebates have not been included as an alternative here.

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
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EXIT



RACE, SEGREGATION, AND EDUCATION IN GEORGIA

by Joseph Monardo



RACE, SEGREGATION, AND EDUCATION IN GEORGIA

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This paper focuses on the connection between race and education in the state of Georgia. Although a historical center of African American success, a central setting for the Civil Rights Movement, and home to “the city too busy to hate,” Georgia has an overwhelming history of segregated populations and segregated schools. Even today, Georgia’s schools exhibit significant levels of racial segregation and corresponding differences in the student outcomes they produce. Viewing Georgia’s racist history as a foundation, I conducted original research using enrollment and assessment data from the Georgia Department of Education to provide a descriptive analysis of race and education in the modern context. Looking at the forces driving the perseverance of racial segregation in modern schools, themes of residential segregation, private schooling, voucher programs, and school tracking are all relevant. I also discuss the Atlanta Public Schools cheating scandal and state’s cityhood movement as they are relevant to race and schooling. By investigating the historical role of race in Georgia’s education system and the role of race in modern Georgia, this paper delivers a survey that begins to unpack the complicated realities that play a fundamental role in the state’s education system.

INTRODUCTION

Racism and segregation have been inextricable from education policy in the United States since the country’s inception. Perhaps more than in other regions and due to a history of formalized segregation, the connection between race and education is especially clear in the American South. This paper focuses on that connection between race and education in Georgia. Although parts of the state — particularly the metropolitan Atlanta area — distinguish themselves from much of the South through their urbanicity and progressivity, Georgia is not exempt from the shameful history of the region. On the contrary, even in the capital, education has been paradigmatic of the structural inequity

that preferences whiteness at the expense of Black students. Nearly 65 years after *Brown v. Board of Education* deemed racial segregation unconstitutional, and nearly 50 years after most Georgia school districts formally desegregated, the state’s school system continues to reveal sharp educational differences based on race, many of which are rooted in the policies of racist segregation in the state’s past.

This paper provides a brief background on the moments, policies, and movements that defined K-12 schooling in Georgia during the 20th century. Then, I discuss the role of race in the current landscape of Georgia schools.

My own experiences as a resident and

student in Atlanta inform this paper. The severe limits of my perspective as a white student are, in some ways, representative of the core problem. I attended a private Catholic school in Buckhead, one of Atlanta's wealthiest areas, on a site that previously served as the Imperial Palace of the Ku Klux Klan.¹ Georgia schools' ties to the state's racist history are not always as explicit, but they are always present.

GEORGIA: A HISTORY OF SEGREGATION

RACISM AND RACIAL PROGRESS IN GEORGIA

Georgia's racist past began with its founding in 1732 and endured after its readmittance to the United States in 1870 following the Civil War.^{2,3} Despite the intensity of Georgia's racist past — or perhaps because of it — it eventually became home to pioneering progress in racial equality and Black empowerment. Over several decades, various organizations and a vast network of Black educators pursued racial justice in Georgia, including school integration and part of the broader Civil Rights Movement.⁴ All the while, Atlanta's political and business leaders branded the state capital as “the city too busy to hate,” aiming to obscure the complex reality of racial struggle for the sake of economic growth.⁵

DECADES OF BATTLES OVER SEGREGATED SCHOOLS

In reality, Atlanta's industriousness was never enough to evade the same forms of racist segregation that defined much of the South, and, by the middle of the 20th

century, it certainly was not too busy to hate. In 1946, Eugene Talmadge won a fourth term as Georgia governor by employing violence and fraud to disenfranchise Black voters;⁶ subsequently, his son, Herman Talmadge, presided over a period of intensified segregation and increased violence against Black leaders.⁷ After the Supreme Court delivered the Brown decision in 1954, Georgia's political leaders amended the state constitution to deny funding to any schools that attempted to desegregate.⁸

Georgia's strategy of overt noncompliance with federal law was bound to be short-lived. Eventually state legislation freed schools to desegregate, but districts often found ways to postpone making any changes.⁹ Around the same time, the national government was taking additional steps to desegregate schools throughout the country, passing the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the Elementary and Secondary Education Action (ESEA) of 1965, and requiring Southern states to not discriminate based on race in order to claim some of ESEA's \$1 billion.¹⁰

Even with legal and financial reasons to desegregate, white school boards in Georgia largely refused. By the end of the 1960s, action from parties including Martin Luther King Jr., Dr. Horace Tate, the Southern Christian Leadership Conference (SCLC), and the Georgia Teachers & Education Association (GT&EA) achieved just enough racial progress in Georgia schools to satisfy the courts but not enough to truly impact the dominance of segregation. However, after the merger of the white Georgia Educators Associa-

tion (GEA) and the Black GT&EA, segregation action almost always resulted in reductions in the number of Black teachers and administrators throughout the South, laying the groundwork for persistent educational disparities in the following decades.¹¹

DESEGREGATION ACTION IN THE 1970S

With the turn of the decade and the election of Governor Jimmy Carter, school desegregation in Georgia gained renewed, albeit muted, momentum.¹² While the state as a whole saw integration as a marginally more viable reality, progress in Atlanta remained uneven. Following years of resistance or partial compliance, Atlanta’s education leaders ultimately reached a desegregation plan in 1973.¹³ The plan dramatically decreased the number of segregated schools (defined as more than 90 percent Black or white), but the prescribed integration only went one way: the plan redistributed Black students to eradicate all 20 of the segregated white schools while leaving 83 of the 86 segregated Black schools intact.¹⁴ The formal busing programs established under the compromise were limited in scope; the major instrument was the expansion of the district’s “voluntary student transportation plan to encourage more Blacks to attend majority-white schools and more whites to attend majority-Black schools.”¹⁵

Overall, the desegregation compromise al-

lowed white leaders to resolve outstanding legal challenges while transferring control of the schools to Black leaders moving forward.¹⁶ An unanticipated but — given the clear history of anti-Black racism in city, state, and country — unsurprising consequence of the transfer of power, business involvement in Atlanta’s education system all but disappeared. Student performance noticeably deteriorated in the following two decades and enrollment in Atlanta public schools nearly halved, shrinking from 119,000 in 1975 to 60,000 in 1995.¹⁷

THE ENDURING EFFECTS OF SEGREGATION IN MODERN GEORGIA

DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS OF RACIAL SEGREGATION IN GEORGIA

Descriptive studies of Georgia schools today leave no doubt that race remains crucial in educational opportunity and student outcomes.

Descriptive studies of Georgia schools today leave no doubt that race remains crucial in educational opportunity and student outcomes. Analyzing data from the Georgia Department of Education and

the U.S. Census demonstrates that clear racial disparities exist both in school attendance and performance measures.

In the 2017–2018 school year, Georgia’s public school system was comprised of 2,271 schools and 1.77 million students.¹⁸ Remarkably, more than six decades after the Brown decision, 9.7 percent of those schools have student populations more than 90 percent Black; an additional 2.8 percent have student popu-

lations more than 90 percent White.

There are noticeable differences in measured student outcomes based on the racial characteristics of a school's student body. A straightforward assessment of whether all students receive equal opportunity to succeed in school is to look for differences in state-measured student outcomes. Georgia uses the College and Career Ready Performance Index (CCRPI) to measure school performance, a metric the Georgia Department of Education touts as "a comprehensive school improvement, accountability, and communication platform for all educational stakeholders that will promote college and career readiness for all Georgia public school students."¹⁹ The DOE weighs four or five categories (depending on grade level) to generate the holistic score, which they use to grade success at the school, district, and state level:²⁰


1. **Content proficiency:** scores on state assessments in English language arts, mathematics, science, and social studies.
2. **Student progress:** student growth relative to academically similar students.
3. **Closing gaps:** the extent to which students are meeting the annual achievement improvement target.
4. **Readiness at year end:** for elementary- and middle-school students, based on literacy and attendance; for high school students, based on demonstrated college and career readiness.
5. **Graduation rate (high-school only):** emphasizes four-year graduation rate while including five-year graduates.

CCRPI scores can range from 0 to 110, and in 2017 actual school scores ranged from 16 to 108. Along with their composite score, schools receive a corresponding letter grade: "A" for a CCRPI at or above 90, "B" for a score between 80 and 90, etc. The Georgia Department of Education provides CCRPI numeric scores for the three school years between 2015 and 2017; the school grade assignments are available for the period between 2013 and 2017.

In 2017, the average school received a CCRPI of 74.33. However, among the 2.8 percent of schools with nearly-all-white student bodies, the average score was 79.55. In the 9.7 percent of schools with nearly-all-Black student bodies, the average score was noticeably lower than average: 62.33. Taking the dataset as a whole, there is evidence of a negative correlation between the share of students who are Black and the school's CCRPI, as shown in Figure 1.

It is important to acknowledge that Georgia schools exhibit significant variation in measurable outcomes that are not entirely described by their racial composition. Additionally, putting too much weight on a state-level metric — even one which aims to be comprehensive in scope — can be dangerously reductive. Various research has shown that Eurocentric pedagogies put Black students and other students of color at a disadvantage, and Eurocentric examinations only exacerbate that phenomenon. In short, the dual concerns here are that (1) the share of Black students is not determinative of a school's CCRPI and (2) the CCRPI is an incomplete measure of student performance to begin

Figure 1: 2017 School CCRPI; coloring corresponds with school performance and size corresponds with 2017 enrollment




with. Both concerns are undeniably valid.²¹ Despite those concerns, this analysis views school-level Black student share and CCRPI simultaneously to draw attention to the problem of school segregation in the state. After state and city politics eradicated the Black teachers’ organization and denied Black students equal opportunity, it is worthwhile to hold the state accountable for the impacts of its actions.

Some variation in school performance appears to be due to differential enrollment patterns within districts and is not purely the product of underlying geographic differences. Within the 12,000-seat district of Troup County, for example, the 18 schools display dramatic differences in

the racial makeup of their student populations. Rosemont Elementary School has a student body that is 11 percent Black, while eight miles down the road Berta Weathersbee Elementary is 84 percent Black. The two schools are emblematic of notable segregation in the district as a whole. Figure 2 shows the Black student share at each school in the district from 1994 to 2017.

Troup County operated an intensely-segregated district in the 1990s before it faced pressure to meet the desegregation obligations imposed upon it in a 1969 Northern District of Georgia injunction.²² In May 1995, the United States sued the county, and a district judge approved a new

Figure 2: Troup County has come full circle in the last two decades



consent decree to implement an updated desegregation plan. The consent decree imposed new desegregation obligations on Troup while granting it the right to apply for “unitary status” and a dismissal of the injunction after three years of compliance. The legal intervention did not even last that long: in 1997, the same judge terminated the agreement, agreeing with Troup that it was not subject to further court oversight because it had already received unitary status in a different 1973 decree.²³ Troup County’s school demographics show the fleeting success of the court’s action and the steady re-segregation that occurred thereafter (as seen in Figure 2).

A larger portion of the racial segregation in schools corresponds with differences in population characteristics by geography. In the Atlanta metropolitan area — inclusive of Atlanta Public Schools and several county-based school districts — schools to the north (in suburbs like Kennesaw, Marietta, and Alpharetta) enroll predominantly white students, while schools to the south (across neighborhoods like East Point, College Park, and Forest Park) enroll mostly Black students.

The large, oddly shaped district of Fulton County is one of the state’s largest. Although Fulton constitutes a single school district, most of the land is divided into 15 separate cities. The newest city of

the bunch is South Fulton, incorporated through a ballot initiative process in 2017. On top of the micro-segregation of cities within Fulton, the entire county is effectively divided between North Fulton and South Fulton. Figure 3 reveals the racial difference between the two regions of the county and the corresponding differences in student outcomes.


Troup and Fulton are both particularly dramatic reminders of the undeniable reality that racial segregation exists in modern-day Georgia; however, the full school segregation story is infinitely more complex than any two districts can tell. One obvious shortcoming of this analysis has been its exclusive focus on Black students, with comparison groups being non-Black

students or white students. In many ways, that likely is the most important racial distinction to make in descriptive studies of Georgia, given the established history of anti-Black sentiment and policy. Regardless, race and racial segregation are undoubtedly relevant factors to education in the state in ways that extend beyond the Black/white divide. Students of Hispanic or Latinx heritage comprise 15.6 percent of the students in Georgia public schools in 2018, and students who identify as Asian are 4.1 percent of the entire student body.²⁴ In some districts, the percentages are much higher.

IDENTIFYING MECHANISMS FOR RACIAL SEGREGATION'S ENDURANCE

Georgia is not the only state in which

Figure 3: Fulton County schools show distinct geographic segregation, both in race and student performance



schools have tended toward segregation, and considerable research has identified patterns of racial difference in education. The most obvious factor that contributes to school segregation is residential segregation. Numerous authors — including Richard Rothstein in *The Color of Law* — have chronicled the United States’ history of inequitable housing laws that intentionally excluded Black Americans and other people of color from certain areas and denied them the access to credit and favorable mortgages that white people enjoyed.²⁵ Rothstein shows a 1938 map of Atlanta from the government-sponsored Home Owners Loan Corporation which denotes areas with large Black -American populations as “hazardous” areas for mortgage lenders.²⁶ Academic research confirms the enduring effect of inequitable lending practices and other discriminatory policies and practices: racial segregation exists in Georgia to this day.²⁷

Academic research confirms the enduring effect of inequitable lending practices and other discriminatory policies and practices: racial segregation exists in Georgia to this day.

Historical exclusion of Black populations, today preserved through public- and affordable-housing efforts which fail to challenge pre-existing segregation, helped create and perpetuate the correlations between low-income neighborhoods, non-white residents, and low resource levels in schools and other services. There are myriad factors that deserve correcting to address racial inequity in Georgia, but neighbors sorting into schools nonetheless has a role to play. Unfortunately, due to

the Supreme Court precedent established in *Parents Involved* (2007), governments face severe restrictions to the active steps they are permitted to take to battle neighborhood segregation in schools, even when the desire and political will exist.²⁸

The role of parental choice remains another relevant factor in the endurance of segregation. First, many white Georgians exert their privilege to opt out of the public system by enrolling their children in private school. The Georgia Department of Education lists 630 registered private schools for the 2018 school year,²⁹ and estimates of the number of Georgia students in private schools range from 155,000³⁰ to 200,000.³¹ Either way, private-school students represent between 8 and 10 percent of the school’s K-12 population and are growing, up 31 percent since 1997 and outpacing public-school enrollment growth during that time. Given that private-school tuition is on average \$11,000 per year, children from high-income families are fueling that growth.

Even controlling for income and parental education, white students are more likely to attend private school than any other racial subcategory.³² Across the South, private-school enrollment surged from 1950 to 1965 and has grown since 1980, while other regions are seeing their private-school figures shrink.³³ The Southern Education Foundation, in a comprehensive 2016 report on private schools, identified Georgia as one of the states with the

largest overrepresentation of white students in private schools: although less than half of Georgia's school-age students are white, they take up three-quarters of seats in private schools. Black students comprise only 16.0 percent of private-school attendees in Georgia, despite representing 35.1 percent of all school-age youth.³⁴

Public versus private schooling is not the only instance in which private choice comes to the fore of race and education in Georgia. Statewide voucher programs and state tax credits to support student attendance in private schools are ways in which state policy reinforces the private system's segregating effects.³⁵ The developed charter movement in Georgia also carries with it racial implications, as research has shown charter schools to facilitate a return to school segregation in diversifying districts.³⁶ Currently, 115 charter schools operate within the Georgia public school system, and an additional 326 schools operate within 32 state charter systems.³⁷ Although they are sometimes employed as productive mechanisms to reduce inequity in the school system and distribute opportunity beyond neighborhood boundaries, magnet and charter schools introduce a stratification within the education system that tends to favor families who bring more privilege into the enrollment process. Saporito (2003) studies the public consequences of individual family choices and presents evidence that higher-status families make school choices to avoid schools populated by low-income or minority students, ultimately increasing segregation indepen-

dent of district policies.³⁸ In podcasts and articles, Nikole Hannah-Jones explores the protectionism and racism fueling efforts to circumvent integration, but also adds a nuanced reflection of the difficulty of making enrollment decisions.³⁹

Even within schools, egregious instances of tracking and other forms of disparate treatment can recreate some of the most harmful effects of school segregation. A 2018 *New Yorker* article identifies Georgia's special-education system as a particularly dramatic example, as educators and administrators disproportionately channel Black students into neglected programs.⁴⁰ Black students in Georgia are 3.6 times as likely to face suspension as white students, and are half as likely to enroll in at least one Advanced Placement course while in high school.⁴¹ In Atlanta Public Schools, Black students receive suspensions at a rate more than 20 times that of white students.⁴²

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A high-profile cheating scandal in Atlanta Public Schools, first uncovered in 2008 but contested until 2012, represents another collision of race and education. The *Atlanta Journal-Constitution* pushed the allegations in their early stages, partially prompted by suspiciously-large improvements in state test scores at 12 schools.⁴³ Ultimately, the conclusive report cited 178 teachers, principals, and administrators who participated in the scheme across 44 schools, which the Superintendent aimed to obscure by destroying evidence and withholding information.⁴⁴ The scandal speaks quite clearly to issues of racial

segregation and inequality, although its precise message is not clear. The teachers who perpetrated the cheating were working in the capital of a state that had destroyed Black teacher advocacy groups, fired Black teachers, and disinvested from Black schools for decades. Around the time of the scandal, Black men made up just eight percent of teachers in metro Atlanta and Black women constituted another 25 percent.⁴⁵ Black students comprised 80 percent of the student population, 98 percent of those expelled, and only half of those designated for Gifted and Talented programs. Given the historical context and the marked differences in the treatment of Black students within the education system, changing test scores could charitably be understood as a gloss-over to endemic problems rather than the principal offense against Atlanta's students.⁴⁶ Even if it was a desperate response to an impossibly-biased system, the widespread cheating evidenced a failing of Atlanta educators to responsibly contribute to student success.⁴⁷

Further complicating the school segregation narrative in Georgia, there are many examples of public schools that educate mostly Black students and score highly on the CCRPI, as alluded to above. In some circumstances, it may be the case that segregated schooling serves Black students much better than integrated schooling does. The period of desegregation in the United States was certainly not unilaterally beneficial for Black com-

munities, and the obstinate politicking that accompanied the period in Georgia sheds some light on why that was the case.

CONCLUSION

In some ways, the endurance of Georgia's history of racial segregation is not surprising: today's racial disparities are, tragically, a coherent extension of centuries of explicit policies of segregation and hate-based racism deeply held by private actors and public leaders. Nonetheless, it is necessary to recognize the very real effect that history continues to have on students of color, and especially Black students, in Georgia.

Reflecting back, my own primary education in Atlanta stands out as a particularly powerful distillation of the way race and education interact in Georgia. After the Klan's Imperial Palace went into foreclosure in the 1930s, the Catholic Church purchased the land that would eventually become the Cathedral and school I attended. With this purchase, the Cath-

Today's racial disparities are, tragically, a coherent extension of centuries of explicit policies of segregation and hate-based racism deeply held by private actors and public leaders.

olic Church was taking advantage of an opportunity that was undoubtedly not available to Black Atlantans. Nearly 90 years later, a former Klan property has transformed into a private school that offers wealthy parents a venue in which they can evade

the deficiencies they perceive in Georgia's public schools. Based on online estimates, less than one percent of students at the school today are Black.⁴⁸ The white hoods have — mostly — disappeared from Geor-

gia as signs of a dominant racist structure, but the reality of segregation remains.

For current and future policymakers in Georgia, meaningful school integration should be among the most pressing priorities. One way to diversify schools and increase equitable access is to expand interdistrict choice programs. The state currently allows intradistrict choice — meaning students can attend a different school within their own district as long as space exists.⁴⁹ Districts can voluntarily permit interdistrict transfers — which provide the opportunity for movement across district lines — but only if the student’s assigned school is 15 miles farther away and takes 45 more minutes to get to than the receiving school; and both the home and receiving school boards must approve the transfer.⁵⁰ For intra and interdistrict transfers, the student’s family must arrange transportation and pay for any associated expenses. Making interdistrict choice programs mandatory for all districts, removing distance restrictions, and guaranteeing state-provided transportation for every student would all be steps in the right direction.

A more fundamental and enduring need is for public schools to remain fully funded moving forward. Governor Nathan Deal’s final budget in 2018 fully funded schools for the first time since the introduction of austerity cuts in 2003.⁵¹ Georgia’s new Governor has allocated even more money for schools in his 2020 budget.⁵² However, many school districts will continue to face financial stress resulting from a funding system that relies heavily on local sources. Until Georgia addresses the disparities in school quality and racialized attendance

patterns, educational inequity will remain the dominant reality.

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THE GENERATIONAL SQUEEZE: YOUNG CALIFORNIANS' FINANCIAL OUTLOOK IN THE WAKE OF THE GREAT RECESSION

by Erin Coghlan and James Hawkins



THE GENERATIONAL SQUEEZE: YOUNG CALIFORNIANS' FINANCIAL OUTLOOK IN THE WAKE OF THE GREAT RECESSION

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Edited by: Nick Draper and Annelise Osterberg

This article examines how young people's economic outlook has fared in California since the onset of the Great Recession. We draw on the American Community Survey and data from the National Low Income Housing Coalition to show how key economic indicators have changed from 2007 to 2016 for different age groups in California, with an emphasis on those aged 18 to 29. While we find that more young people have bachelor's degrees and are more likely to have health insurance than in 2007, we also find that young Californians today are worse off on other indicators such as employment, income, and affordable housing. Moreover, income varies widely for young adults by metropolitan region and race/ethnicity. Given these findings, we discuss policy solutions to offset generational inequity, recognizing that many young adults in California started their life paths during turbulent economic times and face an uncertain economic future.

CALIFORNIA DURING THE RECESSION

In December 2007, the U.S. economy entered one of the worst periods of economic decline in the lifetimes of most Americans: Between the end of 2007 and June 2009, real gross domestic product (GDP) fell 4.3 percentage points resulting in billions of dollars of lost potential output.¹ At the peak of the crisis the U.S. lost nearly 9 million jobs.² California, the nation's largest sub-economy, was hit hard on nearly every major economic indicator.³ In the labor market alone, California lost over a million jobs during the economic decline and unemployment reached well above the national average.⁴ Since the recession, the California and U.S. economies have made strides toward labor market stability,

but it took over six years to recover the number of jobs lost due to the recession, resulting in one of the longest job recovery periods in U.S. history.⁵

The recession hit California's economy particularly hard, but economic outcomes for different demographics varied considerably. For example, researchers at the California Budget Project (now the California Budget and Policy Center) found that the economic downturn reduced employment for single mothers more so than it did for married parents, and also increased poverty among female-headed families with children. This was likely due to sharp budget cuts in California's social programs for single mothers and their children.⁶ The Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC) found that income for

families at all income levels fell between 2007 and 2010, but low-income families experienced the most dramatic losses.⁷ Sylvia Allegretto of UC Berkeley's Center on Wage and Employment Dynamics found that Latinos and African Americans in California had much higher rates of unemployment during the recession than Whites and Asians, with persistent disparities throughout the recovery period.⁸ While such studies illustrate stark differences between individuals from different demographics, we do not yet have a clear understanding of how the recession impacted different age groups of Californians.

RESEARCH APPROACH

The primary goal of this article is to describe the economic impact that the Great Recession had on young people in California (18 to 29-year-olds) relative to other age groups. We analyze data from the American Community Survey (ACS) and also draw on data from the National Low Income Housing Coalition to determine how the recession affected young people in the Golden State. We report on common measures important to economic success such as income and employment, as well as measures increasingly salient to young adult's success in the 21st Century: health insurance, bachelor's degree attainment, and housing affordability.

This paper is outlined as follows: The first section reviews the main findings, examining trends in college attainment, health insurance, employment and income, and housing by comparing outcomes for young Californians to older age groups. The second section discusses new and ex-

isting policy proposals that could potentially improve the economic outlook for young Californians. Lastly, we highlight the state's forthcoming challenges for younger generations.

FINDINGS


EDUCATIONAL ATTAINMENT

To measure educational attainment, we quantify the annual percentage of the California population with a bachelor's degree or higher. This excludes individuals with associate degrees. Specifically, our measure shows the percentage of a given age range that has attained a bachelor's degree or higher from 2007 to 2016.

As shown in Figure 1, there is an uptick in attainment of bachelor's degrees among older age groups, with those who were 65 years-old or older experiencing the sharpest gains. Notably, the youngest age group (18 to 24-year-olds) had by far the lowest attainment rates, which is to be expected considering that most people who have attained a four-year college degree still have not received a degree by their 21st birthday.⁹ It is difficult to determine from this descriptive data whether the dip in college attainment during the recession and recovery years among 18 to 24-year-olds is due to fewer students enrolling in college or students dropping out of college. A study by researchers at the University of Southern California surveyed nearly 1,500 randomly selected California students aged 18 to 26 who left either a community college or four-year institution during the recession period with intentions of returning.¹⁰ They found

that college affordability was one of the top reasons that students stopped attending college during the recession, which is unsurprising given that California raised tuition significantly for state public higher education institutions during this period.¹¹

Figure 1: Trends in bachelor degree attainment rates in California, by age (2007-2016)



Note: This and subsequent figures are the authors' analysis of American Community Survey data for California

HEALTH INSURANCE COVERAGE

Rates of insurance coverage measure the percentage of individuals who have any kind of health care coverage, with a range of plans and varying premiums and co-pays. This measure of health insurance includes comprehensive plans that cover “basic health care needs.”¹²

As shown in Figure 2, the oldest population of Californians (65 or older) experienced very little change over the duration of the recession and recovery period, likely due to their sustained insurance coverage under Medicare. The story for young people is different. The health coverage rate for 30 to 64-year-olds declined before the main elements of President Obama’s Affordable Care Act (ACA) went into effect in 2014. Those who were 25 to 29 years old experienced modest fluctuations before seeing a large uptick in 2014, again, likely due to the ACA. The youngest group, those aged 18 to 24, do not appear to have experienced any losses in health insurance coverage, and actually show the greatest gain of any age group. This age group was likely helped by the provision in the ACA that allowed those 26 and younger to file as dependents on their parents’ private health care plans starting in 2010.¹³ This group saw another coverage boost in 2014 with the implementation of the Covered California health insurance marketplaces, which provided subsidized health insurance coverage for low-income families, as well as plans for individuals with pre-existing conditions that might not otherwise be available in the non-employer health insurance market.¹⁴

EMPLOYMENT AND INSURANCE COVERAGE

To measure employment, we count the proportion of individuals in the labor force who had a job. While this measure excludes many who exited the labor force due to discouragement in the face of poor economic conditions, it also excludes those who might not be working due to

Figure 2: Trends in health insurance coverage in California, by age (2008-2016)





Figure 3: Trends in California employment, by age (2007-2016)



other life events, like attending school. As shown in Figure 3, a clear pattern emerges: The older the person, the more likely they were to have a job during the Great Recession and recovery period. Interestingly, while the oldest age groups tend to cluster closely to one another, the youngest age group (18 to 24-year-olds) had by far the lowest employment rate. As a simple function of their age, young adults have the least amount of average experience in the labor force; therefore, the dramatic drop in youth employment may reflect employers prioritizing more skilled, older employees during layoffs. The recession may have also left less labor demand for entry-level positions, which would have


disproportionately impacted the young.¹⁵

In our measure of income, we include all income sources including wages, retirement earnings, self-employment income, and cash payments through the social safety net. This measure excludes any in-kind government transfers and non-monetary fringe benefits that an individual may receive through their work, such as health insurance or transportation benefits.

Figure 4 shows the median income by age group for earners in California. Every age group except those 65 or older experienced a sharp drop in income at the start of the recession. Notably, all three age

groups that experienced decreases still had not recovered by 2016. In other words, on average, young and middle-aged California workers (under age 65) experienced income loss during the recession that was never regained by 2016.

Figure 4: Trends in median income of California earners, by age (2007-2016)



Given that young people are far more likely to experience poverty than older age groups,¹⁶ we also further analyzed income data to see differences in income level for young people by California metropolitan region and race. Figure 5 shows the percentage change in income for 18 to 29-year-olds across different metropolitan areas of California from 2007-2016 (note: we report mean income rather than median income here). For young people liv-

ing in the Bay Area, incomes grew by 30 percent since the recession began. While this is promising for workers in the Bay Area, in other parts of the state the picture is far from rosy. On average, incomes for young people living in cities like San Diego, Santa Cruz, Sacramento, Santa Rosa, and Napa declined by double digits. In other cities, like San Bernardino and Bakersfield, income declines approached 30 percent. As noted, Figure 5 shows the percentage change in income from 2007 until 2016; the income loss for young Californians across different regions of the state was even greater at the peak of the crisis in 2009-10.

Considering race and ethnicity further complicates this picture. As shown in Figure 6, the median income in California is on average higher for White young adults, and lower for Black, Asian, and Latino/Hispanic young adults, as well as individuals who do not identify with any of the preceding groups or identify with multiple groups. These disparities persist over time, with a stable gap between the top and lowest earners over the duration of the recession. Notably, in 2016, income inequality among young adults by race/ethnicity remained large. The typical White young adult had about \$14,000 in income in 2016, while the median income for young adults in all other groups for the same year ranged from approximately \$9,500 to \$10,800.

HOUSING INDEPENDENCE

In this analysis, housing affordability is essentially a measure of housing independence. We do not have access to each person's individual share of rental income

Figure 5. Mean income for young people (ages 18-29) in California metropolitan regions (2007-2016)






Figure 6. Median income of Californians aged 18-29, by race/ethnicity (2007-2016)



– and measuring the rent burden of each person is complicated in households with two or more adults. In the absence of this data, our analysis compares 30 percent of an individual’s income to data from the National Low Income Housing Coalition covering the fair market housing rates of an average studio apartment in California (we also include fair market rents for the largest metropolitan areas in this analysis). In other words, we compare the individual income resources of each person in our sample to their ability to afford a basic rental unit. We maintain that this method has significant advantages for measuring the state of housing affordability, particularly among young adults, who may be forced into housing arrangements due to resource constraints rather than preferences.

As shown in Figure 7, after the 2007 market crash, rates of housing affordability dropped for all age groups, with more severe drops for those aged 25 to 29 and 30 to 64. While housing affordability for

Figure 7: Trends in California housing affordability, by age (2007-2016)



the three oldest groups began to rebound in 2011-12, housing affordability for the youngest group (18- to 24-year-olds) remained flat. Moreover, three of the four age categories still have not recovered to their pre-recession rates; only those who were 65 or older experienced stronger rates of housing affordability in 2016 than at the onset of the recession. It is also worth explicitly noting that these rates are low by an absolute standard of housing affordability.

POLICY PROPOSALS TO IMPROVE FINANCIAL STABILITY FOR YOUNG CALIFORNIANS

By illustrating how the recession impact-

ed different age groups of Californians, we aim to bring attention to how state policy decisions influence generational equity. The data shows that young Californians fared worse than older age groups along the dimensions of employment and income, and housing affordability. Moreover, income for young Californians differed drastically by region and race/ethnicity. For the 18 to 24-year-olds enrolled in college in 2016, these financial problems may have been compounded, since tuition increased 65 percent from 2008-2018 across 4-year colleges in California when adjusting for inflation.¹⁷ And had it not been for the ACA, it is highly likely that many young adults in the Golden State would have gone without health insurance in the post-recession recovery period. The state can take significant steps to improve the welfare of young adults and mitigate the impacts of a future recession by implementing the following policies.

Invest in higher education: At least half of young Californians who graduate from a four-year college today have student debt, with the average debt load approaching \$23,000 in 2017.¹⁸ This is especially problematic for young people who start off their careers during recessions or recovery periods when employment opportunities for young people may be scarce. One of California's key budgeting challenges comes from the state's reliance on the personal income tax as well as the capital gains tax, which are extremely volatile during economic downturns.¹⁹ During the 2008 recession, major cuts were made to K-12 and higher education due to insufficient state revenue.²⁰ We recommend that policymakers find dedicated sources of revenue for higher education that can

outlast future downturns. For example, a 2018 report from the Institute for Policy Studies outlines a strategy to re-establish an estate tax in California to specifically fund higher education.²¹ The authors estimate an estate tax would generate an additional \$4 billion in annual revenue that could be used to significantly reduce student tuition for the state's 2.5 million students enrolled in California's public higher education institutions.

Implement an Equal Opportunity Grant:

In the absence of family assistance or nominal earnings from work during their high school years, young adults today enter the labor market or college with little to no savings. As a remedy, we suggest that California consider the implementation of an "Equal Opportunity Grant." This grant would be available to all young adults starting at age 18 and phase-out with each additional year of age until recipients are no longer eligible (e.g., 30 years old). Such a grant would specifically help to ameliorate the young adult income disparities documented in this article. The phase-out structure of this program would also help to mitigate any negative labor supply effects associated with traditional cash assistance since it is possible to substitute toward less work but not to substitute toward a younger age.

Expand the Earned Income Tax Credit: Governor Gavin Newsom's budget included an expansion of the Earned In-

come Tax Credit (EITC), which could help young workers offset the high cost of housing in California and address the income loss young workers experienced during the recession. However, proposed increases to the EITC for childless workers are modest. The disparity between state EITC transfers to childless workers and workers with children would remain quite large, particularly among adults with the lowest incomes.²² This is particularly problematic when considering the fact that 91 percent of low-income young adults in California do not have children.²³ Since the EITC is means-tested — meaning it targets low-income individuals and families — significant expansions to it for childless workers may help to ameliorate the racial-income gap among young people that we have shown in this paper. Prior research has shown that state EITC's have the largest poverty reduction effect for people of color.²⁴ For these reasons, we

[Proposed increases to the EITC for childless workers] is particularly problematic when considering the fact that 91 percent of low-income young adults in California do not have children.

recommend increasing the EITC significantly for childless workers.

Expand Medi-Cal to young adults:

On the health care front, Governor Newsom's budget expanded Medi-Cal coverage to eligible young adults ages 19-25 regardless of immigration status, which has the potential

to impact 138,000 undocumented young adults.²⁵ The state has had significant successes improving health insurance coverage among young adults (as seen in Figure 2) but important gaps in health coverage still remain among undocumented youth. To the extent that this policy successfully

increases coverage of uninsured undocumented young adults, the expansion in Medi-Cal would improve the overall insurance rates among young adults.

Build more housing: Governor Newsom’s budget has the potential to indirectly impact young people’s lives through new housing initiatives. The enacted 2019-20 budget identified ways to make housing construction more attractive to developers and encouraged development of low- and moderate-income housing. For example, one-time funds of \$500 million were allocated for the Mixed Income Loan Program, which will incentivize developers to build more mixed-income housing. The budget also expanded the state housing tax credit program to encourage more residential rental developments, and includes incentives for local governments to rezone for greater density and speed up housing production.²⁶ We recommend that the governor and legislature focus these efforts in high density metropolitan areas where higher paying jobs are located for young people.

Much more could be done to focus on single, working-aged young adults who came of age during one of the most severe economic crises in U.S. history.

of the age spectrum. For example, the governor’s budget paid down billions of dollars in unfunded pension and health care liabilities in the California Public Employees Retirement System (CalPERS) and the California State Teachers Retirement System (CalSTRS). The governor’s budget also committed significant funding toward early childhood programs and anti-poverty measures for children. Much more could be done, however, to focus on single, working-aged young adults who came of age during one of the most severe economic crises in U.S. history and experienced harsh losses in income and employment.

experienced harsh losses in income and employment.

Stepping back from the governor’s policy priorities, the state is currently undergoing major demographic shifts. California’s 65+

population is expected to nearly double by 2060, while the population of young people is predicted to decrease significantly in the coming years.²⁷ A ‘greying’ state will mean higher healthcare costs, more pension payouts, and more funding for long-term care services, but with fewer working adults to support an older population. Meanwhile, the next recession may be just on the horizon and California’s General Fund revenue remains extremely sensitive to fluctuations in income tax and capital gains.²⁸ With fewer young people to cover the growing cost pressures of programs for the state’s aging population, alongside the instability of state revenue, young people may get “crowded out” of programs that directly benefit them throughout their lifetime.

FINAL REFLECTIONS

When making important budgetary decisions, state policymakers must consider the impact the state budget has across different generations. While Governor Newsom supports several of the proposals listed above, much of the governor’s policy priorities focus on programs that would benefit generations on either end

These trends result in a 'generational squeeze.' Young people who began college and careers in the aftermath of the recession not only experienced financial setbacks with rising tuition, lower employment and wages, and higher costs of living, but also will be responsible for supporting benefits for older generations that did not experience the severity of the Great Recession in the same way. California policymakers should acknowledge generational equity and recognize that many young adults started their life paths during turbulent economic times and face an uncertain economic future.

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**A CONVERSATION WITH
SARU JAYARAMAN**

A CONVERSATION WITH SARU JAYARAMAN

Edited by: Spencer Bowen, Althea Lyness-Fernandez, and Maitreyi Sista

Saru Jayaraman is Director of the Food Labor Research Center at the University of California, Berkeley, and Co-Founder and President of Restaurant Opportunities Center United (ROC United), a non-profit worker and organizing center that advocates for improved wages and working conditions for the nation's restaurant workforce. She is a graduate of Yale Law School and the Harvard Kennedy School of Government, and has received a variety of awards including the San Francisco Chronicle's 2019 Visionary of the Year, CNN's Top 10 Visionary Women, and 2014 Champion of Change at the White House. She has authored three books on the restaurant industry, all of which have received widespread press coverage and critical acclaim.

We note that after the culmination of this interview, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the One Fair Wage Bill, a bill created in part from the Food Labor Research Center's work that would eliminate the sub-minimum wage for tipped workers. It was the first time since Emancipation that either house of Congress has moved to change this sub-minimum wage.

The below transcript has been lightly edited for clarity.

BPPJ: Would you mind introducing yourself in your own words?

S. JAYARAMAN: Sure. My name is Saru Jayaraman. I am the director of the Food Labor Research Center here at the Goldman School of Public Policy at UC Berkeley. I'm also the co-founder of the Restaurant Opportunities Centers United [ROC United], which is a national organization of restaurant workers, restaurant owners, and consumers working together for better wages and working conditions in the industry.

BPPJ: What were you doing prior to Goldman and ROC?

S. JAYARAMAN: Well I was in law school and graduate school. I was at the Yale Law School and at the Harvard Ken-

nedy School for a master's in public policy. Shortly after law school and graduate school I was working at an immigrant worker organizing center out in Long Island, New York as an attorney and an organizer.

When 9/11 happened, there was a restaurant at the top of the World Trade Center – Tower One – called “Windows on the World.” On that morning, 73 workers died in the restaurant and about 13,000 restaurant workers lost their jobs in New York City following the tragedy. So I was asked as a very young attorney and organizer to start a new relief center in the aftermath of the tragedy for the workers who had lost their jobs and for the families of the 73 victims. And what started as a relief center grew into the Restaurant Opportunities Center.

BPPJ: Did that spark your passion for organizing?

S. JAYARAMAN: No, I had already been doing what you might call “pre-stage organizing” in college and graduate school. I then got a little more formal training with Marshall Ganz at the Kennedy School. The work that I was doing at the immigrant worker organizing center was thinking about how law and organizing worked together. So when 9/11 happened and I was asked to start this new initiative, it was an opportunity to put into place everything that I knew and believed and thought about organizing within an enormous industry. [The restaurant industry] is the nation’s second largest private sector workforce and the fastest growing industry in America.

BPPJ: When did you flip the switch to making activism and organizing your full time work? Did you go to graduate school specifically to help build your skills in organizing?

S. JAYARAMAN: I cannot remember ever wanting to do anything else. Well maybe when I was very young I wanted to be an architect or something like that. But by high school, especially at the end of high school, I knew this would be my life’s passion. I didn’t call it organizing at the time, but certainly knew social change would be my life’s work.

BPPJ: How do you explain what you do at the Labor Policy Center to someone who, even just hearing that name, throws up walls because that sounds like part of the “ivory tower”?

S. JAYARAMAN: There are 20 million people in the United States who sow, harvest, pick, prepare, transport, cook, and serve our food across America. One in six private sector American workers work in food. And unfortunately, despite their size and growth and the fact that we all rely on them to eat, they are the lowest paid people in America and they can’t actually afford to put food on their own family’s tables. And so the work of this center and my life’s work is studying, advocating, working to change that.

One in six private sector American workers work in food. And unfortunately, despite their size and growth and the fact that we all rely on them to eat, they are the lowest paid people in America and they can’t actually afford to put food on their own family’s tables.

BPPJ: Why have you settled on this combination of ROC and also being here at Berkeley doing more formal research? What ap-

peals to you about that mix?

S. JAYARAMAN: It happened somewhat organically – no pun intended! My life’s work for 17 years was ROC. The work expanded into thinking about making federal policy change and changing the narrative. We were realizing that we were up against such a huge barrier in the form of the National Restaurant Association and the way that they’ve brainwashed so much of America – certainly restaurant owners – into thinking there’s only one

way of doing business. And that raising wages would hurt industry and hurt consumers and hurt workers themselves. It became clear over the years that we needed to do more than the things that ROC on its own was able to do. We needed to be able to publish. We needed a platform to be able to change hearts and minds. We needed the ability to speak from an academic perspective and to change policy-makers' minds. And so switching over to Berkeley has allowed me to have the platform that I need to create the foundation for that change to happen.

BPPJ: Would you mind sketching out the outlines of your point of view versus a National Restaurant Association point of view?

S. JAYARAMAN: So I mentioned that in the whole food system there are about 20 million workers and they are the lowest paid workers in America. They're everything from farm workers, meat and poultry processing workers, transportation and distribution workers, and food, retail, and restaurant workers. Within that 20 million workers, 13 million are in one industry: the restaurant industry. And the restaurant industry is not just the biggest chunk of the food system. It's also the number one fastest growing private sector employer in the United States.

Unfortunately it is also the lowest pay-

ing employer within the food system and within the nation as a whole. And so here you've got the largest and fastest growing industry in America with the absolute bottom of the barrel lowest paying jobs. And that is the reason why I've decided to commit my life's work to this. It's important not just to think about restaurants or even to think about food or what we eat. Frankly, it's important for the future of our country, because if the largest and fastest growing industry has the lowest paying jobs, we are growing the low wage floor of the economy from a nation of one in three working Americans working full-time and living in poverty to a nation closer to one in two working Americans working full-time and living in poverty.

For policy students or business students – or frankly anybody thinking about the future of America – when you get to a point where half of the people working can't afford to feed themselves or to con-

sume, you have to ask yourself, what does that do to our GDP? What does that do to our democracy? Fascists rise in the context of extreme inequality and suffering. So our basic point of view is that the \$2.13 wage that exists in our country for restaurant workers, that is a legacy of slavery and a source of terrible sexu-

al harassment, is unsustainable, untenable, unworkable, unethical, immoral, and not good business practice. And so we are

So our basic point of view is that the \$2.13 wage that exists in our country for restaurant workers, that is a legacy of slavery and a source of terrible sexual harassment, is unsustainable, unworkable, unethical, immoral, and not good business practice.

working to change it.

The [National] Restaurant Association's argument is, well, nobody actually earns \$2.13 an hour, they earn much more in tips. There's no reason to pay these folks an actual wage. And if you forced us to pay our workers a wage we would go out of business. Restaurants would fail. Menu prices would be too high, workers would lose their jobs. And all of the evidence from our state of California – which does not have a \$2.13 wage and actually requires everybody to be paid a full wage with tips on top – the fact that our industry is booming and growing faster than any other state, and the fact that tipping is higher and sexual harassment is cut in half, provides clear evidence that what the National Restaurant Association is saying is just not true.

BPPJ: Why do you think such a clear case study is not convincing to some people?

S. JAYARAMAN: It's not that it's not convincing. It's that the Restaurant Association, like President Trump, relies on fear as a tremendous motivating factor. Fear of change is fundamentally the barrier. It's the ways in which fear of change is exploited by a very well-funded trade lobby that has a very big platform and lots of money to spread their messaging both to workers and to employers and uses fear of change combined with their resources

to drive that message. So even if you go to the East Coast and you say, "California, Oregon, Washington, Nevada, Minnesota, Montana, and Alaska are all doing this and succeeding", they will still try to override that very clear evidence with, "Oh, well, those are outliers. You know, actually restaurants are failing in California. You know, nobody can rely on California as an example, it's so different from the rest of the country." We say, "What about Montana and Alaska, Minnesota?" These are all not California but it's just that they're louder and their fear tactics are greater than ours.

BPPJ: As someone who both went to policy school and now researches and teaches at a policy school, what do you see as the strengths of the degree and what are some of the drawbacks?

S. JAYARAMAN: Great question. I will say I definitely enjoyed my policy degree – not even comparable – 20,000 times more than my law degree. What I was studying and learning and talking about were much more relevant to what I wanted to do in the world. They're much more timely. They're much more applicable to actually creating change. And what they used to say at the Kennedy School, and perhaps you hear this at the Goldman School, is that through policy school, you're exposed to so many different things. You learn to not necessarily in two years become an expert in anything, but rather to learn how to speak with some intelligence about a

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wide variety of things. After that, you're able to really hone in on something you want to work on and become an expert with the skills and tools you've learned here, not necessarily the deep issue expertise you've gained here. So that's the real advantage – having those skills and tools that you can apply to any issue.

The disadvantage is that I still think it's not well-known enough. What is a public policy degree? What is it useful for? What ways can it be used? And I think the avenues for people coming out of any school – law school, policy school – are not clear enough. I always say I find law to be a particularly problematic degree because it's one of the few degrees where, as opposed to a degree meant to open many doors and avenues for you, law very much closes the doors because you go through law school and then you're told, "Well, you have to practice law in some form, you have to." And even within practicing law you're very much pushed to do corporate law or to clerk for a judge or do certain things.

With policy school, I would say the doors are much more open, but they're not clear. I think people are presented with the possibility of becoming a policy expert, working at a think tank, perhaps working in government of some kind, or doing consulting. But the avenues around organizing and advocacy and other things that are possible to do with a policy degree are not as clear. It's not just policy schools' fault. It's also that those avenues

in this country are not as valued as legitimate forms of work and forms of social change. You know in the '60s, going into social movement organizing work was what everybody did. It was considered not just cool and hip, but frankly legitimate and credible. And I think that's an avenue that is missing for students and unfortunately it limits people's options to consulting, bureaucracy, government, and think tanks.

BPPJ: Even as someone with a pretty clear vision of what you wanted to do, did you struggle with that coming out of law and policy school?

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S. JAYARAMAN: Absolutely, yeah. I went to Yale and people say there are more public interest people coming out of Yale than other law schools. But the

amount of pressure I felt, you know, you have to practice law and if you're going to practice law, you should do corporate at least for a little while to understand it. I felt [that pressure], thank God I withstood it. But I think my main comment for both law and policy students is to try to, as much as possible, stay true to yourself throughout the process. Figure out what you know you want to do and you don't want to do and definitely be open to the options. But continuously check your gut as to whether that is really what you want to do. And maybe most importantly go and do informational interviews and have experiences that show you...what they [people in specific careers] do on a day to day basis. How much do they interact with people and how much do you want

that? How much do they actually create change and how much do you want that?

Because I think a lot of people feel like, I can create change in these avenues. And then get stuck believing that's the only way to create change when there's many more ways.

BPPJ: Why is it important to you to work with students and teach a class here and there in addition to your other work?

S. JAYARAMAN: Well in addition to trying to raise wages and working conditions and provide research and grounding for policymakers for 20 million workers across America, my other big passion – and how I think these issues that I care about will change – is by increasing the amount of organizing and social movement activity that is occurring in America. And to me, looking and studying social movement history and now teaching it at Goldman – what you see is consistently throughout the history of the world, social movements have been led by young people and by students. And that is missing right now in our world and missing in a time when we need it the most of any time I can think of in my lifetime, certainly. There isn't the kind of mass student activity, certainly not sustained student activity, that we need to see in this moment.

And so I'm very passionate about building that class that I'm teaching right now – Social Movements and Organizing and Nonviolent Direct Action Theory – into

a whole initiative. We are trying to provide students at Berkeley and [students]

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nationwide not just training and social movement nonviolent direct action organizing, but once again building up the idea in students' minds that this is a credible, legitimate, professional, highly-respected avenue of real full-time

work, which is organizing masses of people for change.

BPPJ: Is there a class here that you wish you could take as a student at the policy school? Or a professor you'd really want to work with?

S. JAYARAMAN: I'd love to take many people's classes and learn more. I'd love to take Professor Rucker Johnson's classes, I'd love to take Professor Reich's classes. At the law school there's many folks that I'd love to take classes with. There's a lot happening at Berkeley that's truly fabulous. What I have found is that being able to work with students at Haas and professors at Haas around creating the business case and financial models for employers to figure out how to move to higher wages and better working conditions has been valuable. Working with the law school, we did a joint class last semester on #MeToo and #TimesUp, so looking at the intersections between law and organizing and movement building with regard to sexual harassment in the workplace. Working with other Goldman folks to think about these issues of inequality in the Labor Center

on campus. It's been an amazing experience of collaboration to be able to again advance the needs, interests, and research around the workers in our food system.

BPPJ: Looking back on it, is there something that has surprised you about your time as a Goldman faculty member?

S. JAYARAMAN: At the Goldman School, I've been surprised at how many Goldman students I've had in my classes who have amazing analytical skills and tools that they've learned at the Goldman School, but don't actually know how you advance policy. Many don't actually know how you think about a policy change that needs to happen and then work with the field, the community, people on the ground, people most affected, and policymakers to make, to pass, a bill. Which to me should be a part of being in policy school and why I feel so passionately about what I'm teaching - social movements, organizing, nonviolent direct action. What we teach in my course is not just about organizing, but how you use organizing and social movements and nonviolent direct action to actually advance policy through a legislature (local, state, or federal legislature) and how that's happened through the history of the world and in the United States. So that has been surprising. You know, over time Marshall [Ganz]'s class at the Kennedy School, ac-

tually while I was there, moved from being an elective to being a required course so that students did learn how to use these organizing tools to advance policy. And I would hope over time that we would do the same thing here at Goldman.

BPPJ: As we're awash in presidential candidates it seems like talking about minimum wages is way more central than it was even four years ago. What are you encouraged by in that debate and where do you think many progressive candidates are still falling short?

S. JAYARAMAN: I think part of the reason why it's become so central is two big things: One, we're reaching the highest levels of income inequality in the history of our nation. It is unsustainable on many levels. People cannot afford to consume and I think capitalists like the Jeff Bezoses of the world are starting to notice and starting to say, "Okay, I'm going to pay \$15 [an hour] because I realize I need people to buy my products." So it's encouraging that it has finally become an issue, frankly, unfortunately, because of necessity and crisis. So that's one part of why it's part of the conversation.

The second part of the reason it's part of the conversation is I think finally a lot of people who are left of the aisle are

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waking up to the fact that Trump really won because they ignored these issues for

way too long. That they pursued a neo-liberal, business-first, capitalist agenda at the expense of the hundreds of millions of workers struggling to feed their families, who are working multiple jobs, and who frankly either didn't vote or felt so disgusted with both parties that they thought Trump represented something totally different. So Trump was a wake-up call. So I think that the state, the really very fragile state of inequality and our long-term sustainability as an economy and as a country is one thing and then Trump's election is another thing. Both of which have driven income inequality to the forefront of the current presidential election.

And whereas four years ago candidates were not talking to us, almost every candidate is talking to us right now. "Us" meaning the Food Labor Research Center and ROC. You know, really wanting our research, wanting to know what we have to say, wanting us to do events with them and bring workers to speak with them. And so it's a totally different world. And yet we still have a \$2.13 wage, even though a lot of those people who are running for office are in Congress right now and can push for the minimum wage to go up. And so I think to answer your question, what they are missing is that it can no longer be about just talking about these issues and expecting people to vote for you because you talk about these issues. You've got to understand that at this point until you deliver, people are still going to be as dejected as they've been.

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BPPJ: Is there anyone in public life who you think is doing a really exemplary job not just talking about this but kind of pushing the issue?

S. JAYARAMAN: There are state and local legislators who are doing amazing work. And frankly in an environment like this, that is often where change happens. So there are 16 states where we worked with legislators to introduce bills and we (again meaning the Food Labor Research Center) convened legislators from these 16 states last year and that resulted in the 16 states introducing bills to fully eliminate the sub-minimum wage for tipped work-

ers. Among those states were legislators from Vermont. Sarah Copeland-Hanzas is a legislator in Vermont who moved this bill even when her peers said it was too hard and it's now gaining traction in Vermont.

And some form of it, I think, will pass. In Pennsylvania, Governor Tom Wolf and the Democratic leadership in the state legislature have been moving the most aggressive One Fair Wage bill, which is the most aggressive bill to raise wages in the country. They have a Tea Party Republican-controlled state legislature but that hasn't stopped them from doing a lot of work to advance the issue publicly and using it to mobilize people to actually change the state legislature to win the issue.

That's an example of really using an issue and mobilizing around it, not just the legislators but the field – all the grassroots

groups including ROC Pennsylvania – mobilizing around it to ultimately win it through both policy and politics. And then there are great legislators in Illinois and in New Jersey, Shavonda Sumter in New Jersey who advanced this bill. In Massachusetts, we’ve got amazing women in the legislature who’ve been advancing this for the last several years. So, fabulous legislators at the state and local level. If you’re going to push me to name some federal legislators I will.

BPPJ: I don’t mean to!

S. JAYARAMAN: I mean, it’s important. The bill that proposes \$15 and full elimination of the sub-minimum wage has been led for the last several years by Representative Bobby Scott from Virginia in the House, and Senator Patty Murray from Washington in the Senate. This year it’s being sponsored by Representative Bobby Scott in the House and Senator Bernie Sanders in the Senate. All of those people are people who’ve put their money where their mouth is, or put their actions where their mouth is. I’m not endorsing anybody for President but I will say for my folks, for the workers that I’ve worked with for the last 17 years, they are just not going to go for talk. They want to see people who’ve actually done this stuff for the last many decades.

BPPJ: What’s something fun or new that the ROC & Labor Center are working on?

S. JAYARAMAN: Gosh so much! On the Labor Center side, I mentioned we’re going out on this initiative to train students across the country in social movement history theory and nonviolent direct action. We’re looking at how Ella Baker did training with SNCC [Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee] students, through SNCC, and trying to replicate what she did through boot camps and summer camps for students across the country and organizing a nonviolent direct action and social movement. So that’s exciting, I’m so excited about that. The

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And then on the ROC side, working through the auspices of Berkeley, I think the stuff that we’re doing with Haas to move a lot of restaurant owners towards

what we call the “high road to profitability,” actually providing them with the tools and the help to make the change. It has helped us grow our “high road” restaurant association to 770 restaurant companies ranging from Danny Meyer and Tom Colicchio, Alice Waters – really, really high profile chefs around the country – to small mom and pop restaurants that are working with us.

I’ll just give you an example. Yesterday I met with a very, very well-known restaurant company in D.C. that had pretty publicly opposed our work to raise the minimum wage. And we had a two hour meeting with the partners yesterday

where they said: “We didn’t trust you before. We read your book. We’re coming around. We want to figure this out with you because we see that the old ways aren’t working and we want to figure out how to reduce turnover.” So being able to meet with [the Haas School of Business] and others, and show the business case that you can reduce turnover by providing higher wages and better working conditions has been really exciting.

And then maybe another exciting piece I’ll just mention, which again is a joint project of the Food Labor Research Center and ROC, is a big initiative here in the Bay Area around racial equity in the restaurant industry. We’ve done three years of study and intervention on racial equity, racial segregation, how workers of color are segregated into lower paying segments of the industry like fast food and casual [restaurants]. Even if they’re in fine dining, they’re in lower paying positions: bussers, runners, dishwashers, and cooks, as opposed to servers and bartenders, who in a San Francisco or Berkeley can earn upwards of one hundred thousand dollars a year. They’re the [higher-paid] minority of workers, but that minority is unfortunately held almost exclusively by white men. And so we’ve been doing implicit bias training and testing with over 100 restaurant owners, interviews with workers, implicit bias training and testing with consumers. All of that has led the City of Oakland to work with us on an incentives policy that would provide incentives to

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restaurant owners who work with us to desegregate racially. Part of this initiative is also a building that we’ve bought together with the Ella Baker Center for Human Rights right across from the Fruitvale BART station which will house our largest restaurant training facility in the country, along with a restorative justice center and housing clinic, all in the same building. That will allow thousands

of workers to move up the ladder into livable wage jobs. So addressing implicit bias on the part of the employers, creating a pipeline of workers, and then policy incentives for more employers to actually hire these workers and move away from the racially-segregated

workplaces they’ve had is a super exciting local project. That’s a combination of Berkeley and ROC.

BPPJ: I have one more question for you. You’re very well-spoken. You’re in the public eye a lot. You’re featured on shows and winning awards from the Chronicle [2019 Visionary of the Year]. But still, time is finite. You get five minutes to speak in most cases. How do you think about what to prioritize when you speak?

S. JAYARAMAN: Well every audience is different, you know, and we’ve done, because we’ve done this for so long, we’ve kind of tested and found out what works with different audiences. So with legislators, you know, really talking about the legacy of slavery that is the source of the sub-minimum wage and the sexual ha-

rassment can be the most impactful. Right now talking about the ways in which getting away from a two-dollar wage is a way for states to respond to Trump has been a really effective way to talk to legislators. So that's legislators.

With the public, we've actually done message testing and polling as to what works the best. With the public, the very simple argument, with Republican and Democratic voters alike, that no one should have to work full time and not be able to feed their kids just works. With everybody across the board. It's a simple argument of fairness.

With employers it's a very different message. It's a message of how this is better for business, how they can cut turnover, have a really much more stable staff and thus make their customers more happy, is the message that works.

With students and allies, I think really painting a picture and a vision for how truly transformative change can happen, not just reform but transformative change. Meaning, looking at the moments in history where we've won the greatest, most transformative policies. So, the New Deal, the Works Progress Administration, the Great Society, the War on Poverty. Those were moments where there was tremendous unrest from people on the ground, which should say to students that it isn't just about analyzing policy and talking to legislators and having a lobbyist. That is not how you actually achieve the most transformative change. If you look at history, transformative change comes from outside of the political system, from people rising up in masses and demanding much

bigger change. And the more you're able to, the more you're able to organize, the larger masses of people you're able to have demand things, the more transformative change you can achieve. So it really depends on the audience. If I had, you know, five minutes with students it would be to appeal to this notion that students have played historically such a critical role in winning those most transformative changes in our history.

I do want to add one more thing on the 'Why Berkeley and ROC' work combination. I think there's a sense that if you're at Berkeley you do Berkeley stuff. But as a public university, I think it's imperative for us to not just provide the research and information for change, but to also begin to provide the tools and to partner with organizations that are actually implementing change, if not being engaged in change ourselves. That's why I could not personally just hand over research and analysis and say, "Here, this is why you should think about this differently or do something different." I feel like there's too much at stake for me not to also be involved in working with others outside of Berkeley to make that change happen. So that's why both are important to me.

BPPJ: I think I would argue that that is very Berkeley.

S. JAYARAMAN: Well, if you look back at the history of Berkeley, that is very Berkeley.

BPPJ: Yeah. Awesome. Well thank you for your time. I really appreciate it.

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